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FRUITLESS POISONOUS TREES IN A PARALLEL
UNIVERSE: HUDSON V. MICHIGAN,
KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE, AND THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
DAVID J.R. FRAKT *
ABSTRACT
On June 15, 2006, the Supreme Court announced in Hudson v. Michigan 1 that the remedy of the exclusionary rule would not be available to suppress evidence found in searches after Fourth Amendment
knock-and-announce violations. The decision represents the demise of
the knock-and-announce rule and has broad significance for the future of the exclusionary rule. Hudson creates a potentially broad new
exception to the exclusionary rule (the parallel universe exception)
which relies on what police officers hypothetically could have done instead of what they actually did. It also creates a new class of Fourth
Amendment violations (fruitless poisonous trees) which are automatically ineligible for the exclusionary rule. This Article provides a critical analysis of the majority opinion, responding to each argument
made and addressing major logical flaws and inconsistencies in the
rationales and reasoning offered by Justice Scalia. The Article also
places Hudson in the broader context of the Court's jurisprudence and
addresses the implications of the decision for the exclusionary rule.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 2006, the Supreme Court announced in Hudson v.
Michigan that the remedy of the exclusionary rule would not be
available to suppress evidence found in searches after Fourth
Amendment knock-and-announce violations. 2 The decision was
widely seen in the press as the end of the protection afforded by the
knock-and-announce rule. 3 Although lamentable, the demise of the
knock-and-announce requirement is just the beginning of the damage
wrought by this significant and far-reaching opinion.

2. Id. The Supreme Court has referred to the knock-and-announce rule both with
hyphens and without. I shall use the hyphenated version adopted by Justice Scalia in the
majority opinion in Hudson v. Michigan.
3. See, e.g., David Ashenfelter & Cecil Ange, Cops Don’t Have to Knock, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, June 16, 2006; Joan Biskupic, Justices Allow No-Knock Searches: 5-4 Decision Backing Police Is Major Shift, USA TODAY, June 16, 2006, at 1A; Bob Egelko, Police
Intrusion for Evidence Allowed: Knock, Announce Not Always Needed, High Court Rules,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 16, 2006, at A4; Linda Greenhouse, Court Limits Protection
Against Improper Entry, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A-28; Charles Lane, Court Eases
‘No Knock’ Search Ban: Illegally Collected Evidence Allowed, WASH. POST, June 16, 2006,
at A1; David G. Savage, Justices Ease Limits on Police Entry, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at
A1; Jerry Seper, Evidence Allowed in No-Knock Raid: Court Says Rule Not a Protection,
WASH. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A6; Bill Mears, Police Don’t Have to Knock, Justices Say,
CNN.com, June 15, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/06/15/scotus.search/index.html.
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Hudson is likely to have substantial impacts on law enforcement
and the administration of criminal justice in the United States, as it
creates both a potentially broad new exception to the exclusionary
rule (which I call the parallel universe exception) and a new, secondclass category of Fourth Amendment violations (which I call fruitless
poisonous trees). Although Justice Kennedy claimed in his concurring
opinion that “the continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt,” 4 this claim is unconvincing. Indeed, both liberal and conservative scholars consider
the case a major blow to the exclusionary rule. Dean David Moran,
who represented the petitioner, believes Hudson “[k]ills the [k]nockand-[a]nnounce [r]ule and [p]uts the [e]xclusionary [r]ule on [l]ife
[s]upport.” 5 Professor Akhil Amar views Hudson in a positive light,
but also considers it a momentous decision: “[T]he victors [in Hudson] have now secured a strong base for further action that could
broadly reshape the lines of the exclusionary rule.” 6 This Article provides a critical analysis of the methodology of the majority opinion,
responding to each argument made and addressing major logical
flaws and inconsistencies in the rationales and reasoning offered by
Justice Scalia. The Article also places Hudson in the broader context
of the Court’s jurisprudence and addresses the implications of the decision for the exclusionary rule.
II. BACKGROUND TO HUDSON
A. Pre-Hudson Knock-and-Announce Cases
In 1995, in Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that the
“common-law ‘knock and announce’ principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.” 7 Justice Clarence Thomas—writing for a unanimous Court—stated that “the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether
law enforcement officers announced their presence and authority
prior to entering” 8 and “in some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” 9 Justice Thomas made it clear that a knock-andannounce would not always be required: “This is not to say, of course,

4. Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2170.
5. David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The
Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 283, 295.
6. Akhil Reed Amar, The Battle of Hudson Heights: A Small Case May Portend
Big
Changes
for
the
Exclusionary
Rule,
S LATE,
June
19,
2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2143983.
7. 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
8. Id. at 931.
9. Id. at 934.
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that every entry must be preceded by an announcement.” 10 Later, in
Richards v. Wisconsin, the Court elaborated on the circumstances
under which the police could dispense with the knock-and-announce
requirement. 11 According to the Court, “[i]n order to justify a ‘noknock’ entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” 12 The Court refined the Richards exigency exception in United States v. Ramirez, holding that “the lawfulness of a
no-knock entry” does not depend “on whether property is damaged in
the course of the entry.” 13 Finally, in United States v. Banks, 14 the
Court further elaborated on the knock-and-announce rule, holding
that in a routine case the police must not only knock and announce
before entering, but that the police must allow a “reasonable wait
time” 15 to ensure that “an occupant has had time to get to the door” 16
before forcing entry. The Court did not provide a specific test to determine what would be a reasonable period of time, but rather indicated that reasonableness would be determined on a case-by-case basis considering “ ‘the totality of the circumstances.’ ” 17
Thus, after Banks, it is clear there are two distinct requirements
of the knock-and-announce rule and therefore two potential Fourth
Amendment violations if the police fail to follow the Court’s admonition to both announce their presence and allow a reasonable time for
the occupants to answer the door. What none of these four cases
(Wilson, Richards, Ramirez, and Banks) specifically addressed is
what the remedy for a knock-and-announce violation should be. Of
course, the normal consequence for a Fourth Amendment violation is
the suppression of all “fruits” of the violation under the exclusionary
rule, 18 but none of the knock-and-announce cases explicitly stated
that if the trial judge found a Fourth Amendment violation he or she
would then be obligated to exclude the fruits of the subsequent
search of the residence. In Wilson v. Arkansas, Justice Thomas indicated the issue was not properly before the Court:
10. Id.
11. 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
12. Id. at 394. For an insightful perspective on Wilson v. Arkansas and Richards v.
Wisconsin, see Adina Schwartz, Homes as Folding Umbrellas: Two Recent Supreme Court
Decisions on “Knock and Announce,” 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 545 (1998). Professor Schwartz argues that these two cases were hollow rhetorical victories for defendants which provided
little meaningful protection of traditional Fourth Amendment values. Id. at 567.
13. 523 U.S. 65, 70 (1998).
14. 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
15. Id. at 41.
16. Id. at 39-40.
17. Id. at 42 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)).
18. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).
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Respondent and its amici also ask us to affirm the denial of petitioner’s suppression motion on an alternative ground: that exclusion is not a constitutionally compelled remedy where the unreasonableness of a search stems from the failure of announcement. . . .
[R]espondent and its amici argue that any evidence seized after an
unreasonable, unannounced entry is causally disconnected from
the constitutional violation and that exclusion goes beyond the
goal of precluding any benefit to the government flowing from the
constitutional violation. Because this remedial issue was not addressed by the court below and is not within the narrow question on
which we granted certiorari, we decline to address these arguments.19

In Ramirez, Chief Justice Rehnquist hinted that the issue of
whether exclusion should flow from a knock-and-announce violation
was potentially an open question. 20 However, criminal defense counsel around the country assumed that a knock-and-announce violation
would require suppression, and they filed numerous motions to suppress on that basis. “The cases reporting knock-and-announce violations are legion.” 21 Likewise, the vast majority of state and federal
courts which considered the issue assumed that suppression was required if they found the police conduct unreasonable. 22 Indeed, the
Supreme Court, in two pre-Wilson opinions, found that a knock-andannounce violation of federal search and seizure statutes 23 required
exclusion of the evidence found inside the home following the violation. 24 In one Sixth Circuit case, when the U.S. Attorney argued that
a violation of knock-and-announce did not require exclusion of the
evidence, the Court of Appeals barely acknowledged the argument.
“The government’s argument here is no more than an attempt to circumvent this clear and binding precedent that knock-and-announce
violations require suppression . . . . We do not find this effort convincing.” 25 The two exceptions to the prevailing wisdom were the Michigan Supreme Court 26 and the Seventh Circuit. 27 In 2005, in Hudson

19. 514 U.S. 927, 937 n.4 (1995).
20. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 72 n.3 (1998) (indicating that application
of the exclusionary rule depends on the existence of a “sufficient causal relationship between” the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence).
21. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2174 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
Annual Review, Investigation and Police Practice: The Warrant Requirement, 34 GEO. L.J.
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 19, 31-35 (2005) (collecting courts of appeals cases); William D.
Bremer, Annotation, What Constitutes Compliance with Knock-and-Announce Rule in Search
of Private Premises—State Cases, 85 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (2001) (collecting state court cases)).
22. See infra notes 63 and 64.
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3101-18 (2000); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
24. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301 (1958). The D.C. Circuit recently held that these two precedents were overruled by
Hudson and do not offer an independent basis for exclusion. United States v. Southerland,
466 F.3d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
25. United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 2000).
26. People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000).
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v. Michigan, the Court decided the issue was ripe for resolution. 28
The opinion, issued June 15, 2006, held that the exclusionary rule
would not apply to knock-and-announce violations. 29 This ruling is
both controversial and complex and has implications far beyond the
relatively narrow issue decided.
B. Facts of Hudson v. Michigan
The facts of Hudson, as set forth in the Court’s opinion, are
straightforward and unremarkable:
Police obtained a warrant authorizing a search for drugs and
firearms at the home of petitioner Booker Hudson. They discovered
both. Large quantities of drugs were found, including cocaine rocks
in Hudson’s pocket. A loaded gun was lodged between the cushion
and armrest of the chair in which he was sitting. Hudson was
charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm possession.
. . . When the police arrived to execute the warrant, they announced their presence, but waited only a short time—perhaps
“three to five seconds” . . . . 30

Although the state had a good argument under Richards v. Wisconsin that the officers acted reasonably in this case (since they
might have feared that Hudson would destroy the drugs or pose a
threat to them because of the gun) and, perhaps, could have dispensed with knock-and-announce entirely, 31 Michigan nevertheless
“conceded that the entry was a knock-and-announce violation” because the police did not wait a reasonable amount of time after an-

27. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1075 (2003); see also United States v. Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1105 (2002).
28. 125 S. Ct. 2964 (2005) (grant of writ of certiorari). Interestingly, the Court passed
on at least four opportunities to address the issue before granting certiorari in Hudson. See
Langford, 314 F.3d 892, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1075; Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718, cert denied,
534 U.S. 1105; Mazepink v. State, 987 S.W.2d 648, 657-58 (Ark. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 927 (1999); Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164. Ironically, when it did
ultimately grant certiorari, it was effectively reviewing the exact case it had declined to review in 1999, for People v. Hudson is nothing more than an application of People v. Stevens.
People v. Michigan, 639 N.W.2d 255 (2001); Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53.
29. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
30. Id. at 2162. Justice Scalia’s characterization of “large quantities of drugs” is questionable. See id. In fact, twenty rocks of cocaine were found in the search, among seven
people who were present in the home. Moran, supra note 5, at 297. The trial judge attributed five rocks of cocaine to Hudson and sentenced him to probation. Id. at 297-98.
31. 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
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nouncing themselves before forcing entry. 32 The violation having
been conceded, the only issue for the court to decide was the remedy. 33
C. Procedural History of Hudson v. Michigan
The procedural history of Hudson is noteworthy because the composition of the Court changed while the case was under consideration. The writ of certiorari was granted on June 27, 2005. 34 The original oral argument was held on January 9, 2006. 35 Before a decision
in the case could be reached, Justice O’Connor retired on January 31,
2006; she was replaced the same day by Justice Alito. With Justice
O’Connor’s departure, the Court was apparently deadlocked 4-4, so
the Court granted re-argument on April 19, 2006. 36 The case was reargued on May 18, 2006. 37 The case was decided on June 15, 2006, in
favor of the State of Michigan by a 5-4 margin. 38
D. Brief Summary of Holding
The issue in Hudson, as framed by Justice Scalia, was “whether
violation of the ‘knock-and announce’ rule require[d] the suppression
of all evidence found in the search.” 39 A five-member majority concluded that evidence found in a search after a knock-and-announce
violation would not be considered “fruit” of the violation and therefore need not be suppressed. The Court cited two major reasons.
First, the “social costs” of applying the exclusionary rule would outweigh its deterrence value, especially since there were civil remedies
available which would have a deterrent effect: “[T]he social costs of
applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are
considerable; the incentive to such violations is minimal to begin
with, and the extant deterrences against them are substantial . . . .”40
32. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163.
33. Id. The apparent reason the prosecutor conceded the violation at the trial court
level was that under People v. Stevens, there was no remedy for a knock-and-announce violation in Michigan, so there was no harm in conceding one. 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999).
34. Hudson v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2964 (2005).
35. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2159.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. According to counsel for petitioner Hudson, David Moran (Associate Dean at
Wayne State University College of Law), who agreed to be quoted for this Article, Justice
O’Connor appeared to be favorably disposed toward his client’s position in the original oral
argument, and he felt certain that she would have voted to enforce the exclusionary rule.
Based on her prior opinions in exclusionary rule cases, including her dissent in Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (discussed in Section XXI), this conclusion seems warranted. Thus, the retirement of Justice O’Connor and her replacement by Justice Alito very
likely changed the outcome of the case. This view was echoed in several press accounts. See
supra note 4. Dean Moran provides further support for this position in his article. Moran,
supra note 5.
39. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162.
40. Id. at 2168.
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Second, the evidence was discovered during a search with a valid
warrant. 41 According to the majority, the knock-and-announce violation simply accelerated the finding of the evidence by a few seconds;
thus, there was only a limited causal connection between the violation of the rule and the seizure of the evidence. 42 Accordingly,
“[r]esort[ing] to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt
is unjustified.” 43
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito. 44 Justice Kennedy concurred in a separate opinion. 45 Justice Breyer wrote an impassioned and lengthy dissent, which was joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Stevens. 46
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION IN HUDSON V.
MICHIGAN
The Court’s opinion is deeply flawed, both philosophically and
logically; it is not only riddled with inconsistencies and invalid conclusions, but is at times intellectually dishonest. According to Professor LaFave, “Hudson deserves a special niche in the Supreme Court’s
pantheon of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as one would be
hard-pressed to find another case with so many bogus arguments
piled atop one another.” 47 In short, the Court is “dead wrong.” 48 Some
of these “bogus arguments” and other weaknesses are explored by
the dissent of Justice Breyer; 49 this Article expands on some of Justice Breyer’s arguments and focuses on additional points not raised
by the dissent.
A. The Causation Argument
The majority’s most superficially persuasive argument in support
of the position that the exclusionary rule should not apply is its causation argument—that is, the knock-and-announce violation did not
cause the incriminating evidence to be found and therefore suppression is unwarranted. 50 But the causation argument depends on the

41. Id. at 2162.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2168.
44. Id. at 2161.
45. Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 2171 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
47. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 4TH AMENDMENT §
11.4, at 15-16 Supp. (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2007).
48. Id. at 15 Supp.
49. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 2164 (majority opinion).
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majority’s characterization of the constitutional violation and their
definition of causation, both of which are flawed. 51
The majority and the minority characterize the constitutional violation quite differently. The majority’s characterization of the unconstitutional police conduct in Hudson could be summed up as “after an
unlawful entry, but during a lawful search, the police found incriminating evidence.” Put in these terms, it would seem unfair to penalize the police (or society) by excluding valid evidence that the police
discovered during the search. Viewed from a different perspective,
exclusion seems much more logical. The minority’s characterization
of the constitutional violation could be summed up as “during an unreasonably executed search, the police found incriminating evidence.”
Stated this way, suppression would seem to be inevitable. The minority’s view is more consistent with the Court’s prior view of the entry
as an integral component of the search. 52 As Justice Breyer states,
[S]eparating the “manner of entry” from the related search slices
the violation too finely. As noted . . . we have described a failure to
comply with the knock-and-announce rule, not as an independently unlawful event, but as a factor that renders the search “constitutionally defective.” 53 . . . “([A] lawful entry is the indispensable
predicate of a reasonable search.)” 54

According to Justice Breyer, “[t]he officers’ failure to knock and announce rendered the entire search unlawful, . . . and that unlawful
search led to the discovery of evidence in petitioner’s home.” 55 Put
another way, if compliance with knock-and-announce is part of the
inquiry into the reasonableness of the search and reasonableness of
the search determines whether the exclusionary rule will be applied,
then a knock-and-announce violation must trigger the exclusionary
rule. 56 The majority did not see it this way.
The majority and minority also differed in their definition of the
term “causation.” According to Justice Scalia, “the constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence. Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or
not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained,
and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house.” 57
Justice Kennedy, in a separate concurring opinion, endorsed this
view of causation: “In this case the relevant evidence was discovered
51. See id. The argument also assumes that the exclusionary rule has a rigid causation requirement, a proposition that is challenged later in this Article. See infra Part V.I.
52. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995)).
54. Id. (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 53 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
55. Id. at 2184.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 2164 (majority opinion).
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not because of a failure to knock-and-announce, but because of a subsequent search pursuant to a lawful warrant.” 58 Justice Kennedy further explained, “When . . . a violation results from want of a 20second pause but an ensuing, lawful search lasting five hours discloses evidence of criminality, the failure to wait at the door cannot
properly be described as having caused the discovery of evidence.” 59
Justice Breyer, writing for the minority, took a decidedly different
view of causation:
The majority first argues that “the constitutional violation of an
illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the
evidence.” . . . But taking causation as it is commonly understood
in the law, I do not see how that can be so. . . . Although the police
might have entered Hudson’s home lawfully, they did not in fact do
so. Their unlawful behavior inseparably characterizes their actual
entry; that entry was a necessary condition of their presence in
Hudson’s home; and their presence in Hudson’s home was a necessary condition of their finding and seizing the evidence. At the
same time, their discovery of evidence in Hudson’s home was a
readily foreseeable consequence of their entry and their unlawful
presence within the home. 60

Perhaps the minority would have been better served citing a definition of but-for causation in the criminal law context. Using Professor Dressler’s definition of “actual” or “factual” causation, but-for
causation can be summed up as follows: but for the voluntary act(s)
of the person in question, the event would not have occurred “when it
did.” 61 A person who advances the time of an inevitable occurrence
even by a few seconds is still said to have caused the event. For example, one who hastens the death of one who has been fatally
wounded (for example, by shooting or stabbing them), is still considered to be a “but for” cause of death and is still guilty of murder. 62 Although the victim would have died, the victim would not have died
when he or she did. Using this definition, although the knock-andannounce violation may have gained the police only a few seconds’
advantage, it can be said unequivocally that but for the knock-andannounce violation, they would not have discovered the incriminating evidence when they did. The three emphasized words are critical,
for without them, the majority can fairly say the knock-andannounce violation was not a but-for cause; had the police not violated the knock-and-announce rule, they still would have found the
58. Id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
61. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 14.02, at 196 (4th ed. 2006).
62. Id. at 198-99. See State v. McDonald, 90 Wn. App. 604, 614 (1998) (collecting
“hastening of death” cases); see also Henderson v. State, 65 So. 721 (Ala. Ct. App. 1914);
People v. Cox, 123 Colo. 179 (1951); State v. Weston, 155 Ore. 556 (1937).
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evidence, just not at the exact moment. Without the “when they did”
element of the causation definition, knock-and-announce violations
have the air of inevitable discovery about them. Professor Dressler’s
definition of causation directly refutes Justice Kennedy’s view. Might
a better-framed causation argument on the part of the dissenters
have been enough to sway Justice Kennedy to their side? It is an
intriguing possibility.
B. The “Protected Interests” Argument
A new rationale offered by Justice Scalia for declining to apply the
exclusionary rule is what might be called the “protected interests”
theory. Under this rule, each requirement of the Fourth Amendment
is designed to protect specific discrete interests. Only if the exclusionary rule “vindicates the entitlement” would it be appropriate to
apply it. According to Justice Scalia, the knock-and-announce requirement is designed to protect “human life and limb,” “property,”
and “privacy and dignity”—not the shielding of potential evidence
from the government’s eyes, in contrast to the warrant requirement. 63 “[T]he knock-and-announce rule has never protected . . .
one’s interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking
evidence described in a warrant. Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence,
the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”64 In support of this theory, Justice
Scalia cited two cases, United States v. Ceccolini65 and New York v. Harris.66 Neither case provides convincing support for this argument.
Ceccolini was a straightforward application of the attenuation
doctrine. 67 The case involved a warrantless search. 68 Evidence discov63. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
64. Id.
65. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
66. 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
67. 435 U.S. at 268. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). In Ceccolini, a police officer lawfully entered a
flower shop, the owner of which, Ceccolini, was suspected to be involved in illicit gambling
operations. 435 U.S. at 269, 271. The police officer noticed an envelope with some money in
it by the cash register and sneaked a look inside. Id. at 270. He noticed some “policy
slips”—evidence of illegal gambling. Id. The officer asked a shop employee to whom the envelope belonged, and she indicated it belonged to Ceccolini. Id. The police officer reported
this tidbit of information to the FBI. Id. Four months later, the FBI approached the flower
shop employee and asked if she knew anything about Ceccolini’s involvement in gambling.
Id. at 272. She volunteered to help and provided information about Ceccolini’s illicit gambling activities. Id. Ceccolini was later summoned before a grand jury and testified that he
was not involved in illegal gambling activities. Id. The employee testified at the grand jury
to the contrary. Id. Ceccolini was charged with perjury. Id. At his criminal trial, he moved
to suppress the evidence of the envelope and its contents as well as the testimony of the
employee. Id. The trial judge excluded the envelope and its contents but permitted the
witness to testify and found Ceccolini guilty of perjury. Id. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, finding that the employee’s testimony was fruit of the poisonous
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ered during the search was excluded, but a witness that was discovered as a result of the unlawful search was allowed to testify. 69 Although the Court did speak of protected interests, it did so in the
context of the interests the exclusionary rule was designed to protect,
rather than the interests the warrant requirement was designed to
protect. 70 “[C]onsiderations relating to the exclusionary rule and the
constitutional principles which it is designed to protect must play a
factor in the attenuation analysis . . . .” 71 The point of Ceccolini was
that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter constitutional violations. Thus, it was reasonable to consider whether exclusion of evidence in a given case would deter constitutional violations. 72 The
Court made it clear that it was proper to apply the exclusionary rule
to deter constitutional violations, but found that the deterrence value
of applying the exclusionary rule to the testimony of this specific
witness was “speculative and very likely negligible.” 73
New York v. Harris does appear, at first glance, to provide limited
support for the protected interests theory. 74 In Harris, the Court declined to suppress statements made by an arrested suspect in the
station house after full rights advisement when the police had probable cause for the arrest, but had arrested the suspect in his home
without an arrest warrant as required by Payton v. New York. 75 The
Court agreed that statements made to the police in Harris’ home
were properly suppressed, but declined
to apply the exclusionary rule [to the other statement] because the
rule in Payton was designed to protect the physical integrity of the
home; it was not intended to grant criminal suspects, like Harris, protection for statements made outside their premises
where the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for
committing a crime. 76

tree, as her knowledge about Ceccolini’s gambling activities was discovered as a result of
the police officer’s unlawful search. Id. at 273. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. Applying
the attenuation doctrine, the Court held that the taint of the police officer’s unlawful
search had been dissipated by the passage of time and by the “free will” of the voluntarily
cooperating witness. Id. at 279.
68. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 272.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 279.
71. Id. Although Justice Scalia purports to apply a form of attenuation analysis in
Hudson, the case clearly does not fit the mold of prior attenuation cases; as Justice Breyer
notes in dissent, “the majority gives the word ‘attenuation’ a new meaning.” Hudson v.
Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2180 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 280.
73. Id.
74. 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
75. Id. at 16-17; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
76. Harris, 495 U.S. at 17.
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Although couched in “protected interests” language, the opinion
makes clear that Harris’ rights were not violated at all by taking the
statement in the station house because the arrest essentially became
legal once the suspect was removed from his home. 77 According to the
Court, the evidence sought to be excluded was not even “in some
sense the product of illegal government activity.” 78 The Harris Court
made it clear that evidence obtained in a home after an unlawful invasion of the home should be suppressed. 79 Ironically, Justice Scalia
cites Harris to bolster his argument that evidence obtained in the
home after an unlawful invasion of the home should be admitted.80
The Court’s prior precedents offer such scant support for the protected interests theory that Professor LaFave concluded that this “totally new interest-based attenuation doctrine” was “created out of
whole cloth.” 81 Although the doctrine may well have been created out
of whole cloth, it does not seem to have been created by Justice
Scalia. Although not cited by him, the “protected interests” rationale
was first used as a basis for declining to apply the exclusionary rule
to a knock-and-announce violation several years earlier in United
States v. Espinoza. 82 In a section of the opinion headed, “The Exclusion of Evidence Is a Disproportionately Severe Sanction in Cases
Where the Police Conduct Does Not Actually Harm Protected Interests,” Judge Coffey wrote:
[W]here the violation of the Fourth Amendment in a particular
case causes no discernable harm to the interests of an individual
protected by the particular constitutional prohibition at issue (in
the present case the knock and announce requirement), the exclusion of evidence for the trial is a disproportionately severe and inappropriate sanction. 83

According to Judge Coffey, “[t]he core interest protected by the knock
and announce requirement is . . . the receipt of notice by occupants of
the dwelling sufficient to avoid the degree of intrusiveness attendant
to a forcible entry as well as any potential property damage that may
result.” 84 Judge Coffey concluded, “The [o]fficers’ [c]onduct [d]id
[n]ot [h]arm Espinoza’s [i]nterests [p]rotected by the [k]nock and
[a]nnounce [r]ule.” 85

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2169 (2006).
LAFAVE, supra note 47, at 16 Supp.
256 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 725 (citation omitted).
Id. at 727.
Id. at 726.
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Judge Coffey’s approach was criticized in a vigorous dissent by
Judge Wood 86 and by the Harvard Law Review. 87 Professor LaFave
called the opinion “troublesome” and “wrong.” 88 But the protected interests theory was not Judge Coffey’s brainchild. Judge Coffey was
relying on an opinion by Judge Posner, who appears to have originated the theory. In United States v. Stefonek, the police searched
Stefonek’s home using a defective warrant. 89 The warrant failed to
state with particularity the items to be seized, stating only that “evidence of crime” should be seized. 90 Although the application for the
warrant stated with specificity what the police wished to seize, the
application was not incorporated by reference into the warrant. 91
Thus, the warrant was plainly defective on its face. 92 According to
Judge Posner, “[s]o open-ended is the description that the warrant
can only be described as a general warrant.” 93 Not even the goodfaith exception could salvage such a plainly defective search. 94 As
Judge Posner acknowledged, it would be “difficult” for the officers to
“squeeze themselves into the exception to the exclusionary rule that
the Supreme Court created in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), for unconstitutional searches conducted in good-faith reliance
on a warrant. . . . because the defect in the warrant was patent . . . .” 95
Nevertheless, Judge Posner found a way to circumvent the exclusionary rule and allow the evidence in. One rationale advanced by
Judge Posner was the protected interests theory. 96 According to
Judge Posner, “there must be a causal relation between the violation
of the Fourth Amendment and the invasion of the defendant’s interests for him to be entitled to the remedy of exclusion.” 97 Judge Posner
cited no authority for this extraordinary proposition. According to
Judge Posner, Stefonek’s interest protected by the particularity requirement was the right not to be subjected to a search that would
exceed the scope that a magistrate could have lawfully authorized. 98
Judge Posner concluded that this interest was not violated because
“[t]he search would . . . have been identical in scope, and exactly the
same evidence would have been seized, had the warrant complied

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 729 (Wood, J., dissenting).
Recent Cases, United States v. Espinoza, 115 HARV. L. REV. 709 (2001).
LAFAVE, supra note 47, at 274.
179 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1032-33.
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1033-34.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1035.
Id.
Id. at 1033.
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with the Constitution, which is to say, had the warrant repeated the
application’s description of the things to be seized.” 99
The problem with the protected interests theory is that the application of the exclusionary rule depends entirely on the way that the
judge chooses to characterize the interests. It invites judges to circumvent application of the exclusionary rule by creative and narrow
characterization of the interests protected by each requirement previously imposed by the Court. A broad interpretation of Fourth
Amendment interests, such as “the interest in being free from unreasonable police activity,” leads to exclusion, while a narrow interpretation does not. This creates a powerful incentive to narrowly interpret the Fourth Amendment.
For example, consider the warrant requirement. Justice Scalia
characterized the right protected by the warrant requirement as an
“entitlement” of citizens “to shield ‘their persons, houses, papers, and
effects,’ from the government’s scrutiny.” 100 Thus, according to Justice Scalia’s logic, the fruits of a warrantless search would generally
be subject to exclusion. However, under Judge Posner’s analysis, the
warrant requirement could be characterized as protecting the interest in being subjected only to a search that a magistrate could (or
would) have authorized. Under this interpretation, so long as the police could have applied for a warrant (that is, had probable cause)
and the search was limited in scope to what a magistrate would have
lawfully authorized if presented with a proper warrant application,
then applying the exclusionary rule would not be necessary. This is
exactly the scenario proposed by Professor Akhil Amar as the next
logical step in dismantling the exclusionary rule. 101 According to Professor Amar, “[w]ith Hudson on the books, state and federal prosecutors should now try to find the Next Perfect Test Case.” 102 Professor
Amar’s ideal of the “Next Perfect Test Case” is one where the police
had probable cause to search but failed to obtain a warrant under a
good-faith mistaken belief that they did not need one because they
believed that an exception to the warrant requirement (such as consent or exigent circumstances) existed. 103 However novel and unsupported it may be, the protected interests theory is a potentially powerful weapon in the arsenal of those seeking to limit or destroy the
exclusionary rule.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1034.
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
Amar, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
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C. The Costs of the Exclusionary Rule
The majority’s primary justification for declining to apply the exclusionary rule is not lack of causation, but the “costs” of its application. 104 According to Justice Scalia,
[t]he costs here are considerable. In addition to the grave adverse
consequence that exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence always entails (viz., the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into
society), imposing that massive remedy for a knock-and-announce
violation would generate a constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule, and claims that any asserted Richards justification
for a no-knock entry had inadequate support. The cost of entering
this lottery would be small, but the jackpot enormous: suppression
of all evidence, amounting in many cases to a get-out-of-jail-free
card. Courts would experience as never before the reality that
“[t]he exclusionary rule frequently requires extensive litigation to
determine whether particular evidence must be excluded.” 105

Thus, according to Justice Scalia, there are actually multiple
types of costs involved. The first is the classic argument against the
exclusionary rule—“the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into society” or, as famously put by Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, “the
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.” 106 This
argument was rebutted by Justice Brennan in dissent in the case of
U.S. v. Leon: 107
[T]he Court has frequently bewailed the “cost” of excluding reliable
evidence. In large part, this criticism rests upon a refusal to acknowledge the function of the Fourth Amendment itself. If nothing
else, the Amendment plainly operates to disable the government
from gathering information and securing evidence in certain ways.
In practical terms, of course, this restriction of official power
means that some incriminating evidence inevitably will go undetected if the government obeys these constitutional restraints. It is
the loss of that evidence that is the “price” our society pays for enjoying the freedom and privacy safeguarded by the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, some criminals will go free not, in Justice (then
Judge) Cardozo’s misleading epigram, “because the constable has
blundered,” but rather because official compliance with Fourth
Amendment requirements makes it more difficult to catch criminals. Understood in this way, the Amendment directly contemplates that some reliable and incriminating evidence will be lost to
the government; therefore, it is not the exclusionary rule, but the
Amendment itself that has imposed the cost. 108

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
Id. (citations omitted).
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1926).
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Id. at 941 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Defore, 150 N.E. at 587).
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This argument did not sway Justice Scalia, who speaks only of the
costs of the exclusionary rule. Even if we assume that there are
“costs” associated with the exclusionary rule, what about the countervailing costs? As Justice Stevens has stated, “the more relevant
cost is that imposed on society by police officers who decide to take
procedural shortcuts instead of complying with the law.” 109 Justice
Stevens was referring to the costs of litigation and delays to justice
occasioned by police misconduct. 110 The majority has simply removed
this cost from the balance sheet by eliminating the availability of the
exclusionary remedy. 111 Without the availability of the exclusionary
remedy, there will be no litigation, 112 no delay, and no costs to society.
Justice Scalia also gives short shrift to the most important countervailing cost—the costs to society and to individuals when the police fail to follow the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. In discussing “the interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement,” Justice Scalia notes three: first, “the protection of human life
and limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence in
supposed self-defense by the surprised resident.” 113 He is presumably
concerned about the police officers who may be shot, as well as the
resident who may mistakenly shoot at the police, then be shot himself in response. 114 The second interest is “the protection of property,”
since requiring the police to knock-and-announce and wait a few
moments gives the residents a chance to open the door before the police break it down. 115
And thirdly, the knock-and-announce rule protects those elements
of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance.
It gives residents the “opportunity to prepare themselves for” the
entry of the police. “The brief interlude between announcement
and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed.” 116

Justice Scalia minimized the significance of the privacy interests
protected by knock-and-announce by characterizing the requirement
of delayed entry merely as an “opportunity to collect oneself before
answering the door.” 117 There is no mention of the right to be secure
in one’s own home, the fear and anxiety and shock created when the
109. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 457 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 457-58.
111. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
112. As suppression will be unavailable, there will be no point in defense counsel filing
suppression motions. This argument is further developed in Part VI.C, infra.
113. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997)).
117. See id.
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police suddenly invade an individual’s or family’s personal domain
without warning, or the larger cost to society of living in a country
where the police need not knock and announce their presence before
entering homes to search. Professor Gerald Uelman mentions another important omission by Justice Scalia: “I found it somewhat remarkable that the U.S. Supreme Court made no reference at all to
one of the most important interests served by the knock-andannounce requirement: the protection of victims of ‘wrong door’ raids
by law enforcement officers.” 118 Greater consideration of these costs
might have tipped the balance in favor of giving the knock-andannounce rule the teeth of the exclusionary rule.
D. Costs to Judicial Economy: The Potential for a Flood of Litigation
The other cost that Justice Scalia cites is a burden to judicial
economy. 119 He speculates that imposing the remedy of exclusion for
a violation of the knock-and-announce rule would “generate a constant flood”120 of litigation. “Courts would experience as never before the
reality that ‘[t]he exclusionary rule frequently requires extensive litigation to determine whether particular evidence must be excluded.’ ”121
Aside from the obvious point that courts exist for the purpose of
resolving issues of constitutional rights, there is another reason that
this argument is disingenuous. When Justice Scalia states that allowing an exclusionary remedy would suddenly open the floodgates
“as never before,” 122 he fails to mention that the floodgates already
were open and there was no flood. If there were going to be a substantial amount of frivolous litigation, then this problem would already have manifested itself, since the vast majority of courts have
been open to suppression motions based on knock-and-announce violations for several years.
Although the Supreme Court had not explicitly stated that a
knock-and-announce violation would automatically lead to exclusion
of evidence, the assumption of most lower courts has been that it
would. The Supreme Court itself had on two occasions prior to Wilson
v. Arkansas 123 found that a knock-and-announce violation required
exclusion of the evidence found inside the home following the violation. 124 When the U.S. Attorney argued before the Sixth Circuit that
118. Gerald F. Uelman, Knock and Announce Violations After Hudson v. Michigan,
THE CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 2006, at 62,
119. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
120. Id. at 2166.
121. Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 366 (1998)).
122. Id.
123. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
124. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301 (1958).
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a violation of knock-and-announce did not require exclusion of the
evidence, the Court did not even consider it a close issue: “The government’s argument here is no more than an attempt to circumvent
this clear and binding precedent that knock-and-announce violations
require suppression . . . . We do not find this effort convincing.”125
Conspicuously absent in Justice Scalia’s opinion is any mention of
the fact that the overwhelming majority of courts to consider the issue, both state and federal, had determined that violations of knockand-announce did require the suppression of evidence, although the
petitioner’s brief had made this plain. 126
In addition to the circuits noted by petitioner (Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Tenth), 127 the First and Ninth Circuits also applied the
exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations or indicated that
they would in the appropriate case. 128 Justice Breyer noted that there
had been many reported cases. 129 It is instructive that Justice Scalia
did not note any of these prior decisions or even that there was a circuit split on the issue. It would have been more difficult for the Justice to flatly state his conclusion that the courts would be inundated if he had to acknowledge that a knock-and-announce exclusionary rule in so many courts had not resulted in an unmanageable flood of litigation.
Justice Scalia does not actually say that criminal defendants
would make frivolous suppression motions, but this must be what he
means because no Justice would announce an intent to discourage
legitimate claims of constitutional violations. The clear implication
by Justice Scalia is that criminal defendants would readily bend the
truth about the nature of the police entry into their home, falsely
claiming that they failed to knock-and-announce or falsely claiming
that they did not wait a reasonable time before entering. When the
125. United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 2000).
126. Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006) (No. 041360), 2005 WL 2072141 (According to Petitioner’s brief, “[a]t least ten federal and state
appellate courts have rejected the position of the Michigan Supreme Court by squarely
holding that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not exempt knock and announce violations from the exclusionary rule [ten listed cases omitted]. Only one appellate court, the
Seventh Circuit, has endorsed the Michigan Supreme Court’s position. United States v.
Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894-895 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1075 (2003). Courts
in many other jurisdictions have assumed that evidence seized inside a home after a knock
and announce violation is the fruit of the violation and have therefore suppressed such
evidence [fourteen listed cases omitted]. The clear majority of state and federal courts thus
continue to suppress evidence seized from homes immediately after knock and announce
violations . . . .”).
127. United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 153 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Dice,
200 F.3d 978, 984-86 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir.
1993); United States v. Gallegos, 314 F.3d 456, 458 (10th Cir. 2002).
128. United States v. Banks, 282 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d on other grounds,
540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003). See United States v. Boulanger, 444 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2006).
129. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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police admitted to dispensing with knock-and-announce, Justice
Scalia implies that defendants would frivolously challenge the government’s proffered justifications for doing so. Justice Scalia offers no
evidence to support these conclusions, nor does he explain why the
danger of superfluous suppression motions is greater in the knockand-announce context than any other. Justice Scalia also seems to be
assuming that criminal suspects have a sophisticated knowledge of
Fourth Amendment rights; this may not be warranted. Criminal defendants would only know to make up a phony story about a knockand-announce violation if they knew the knock-and-announce rules.
But many accused criminals would probably assume that a valid
search warrant gives the police the right to enter the home and
would not be attuned to the subtleties of knock-and-announce.
There is an additional reason to be skeptical about Justice Scalia’s
concern about a flood of frivolous claims. Motions to suppress are
filed by criminal defense attorneys. They are not invented from
whole cloth, but must be based on the police reports or supported by
affidavits by witnesses. Justice Scalia ignores defense attorneys’
ethical obligation not to raise meritless claims or to knowingly allow
their clients or any other witness to commit perjury. 130 Assuming the
good faith of the defense bar, courts would be flooded with motions to
suppress for knock-and-announce violations only if the police conduct
routinely violated the Fourth Amendment or if there was at least a
colorable claim.
Even Justice Scalia’s claim of an enormous “jackpot” “amounting
in many cases to a get-out-of-jail-free card” must be viewed with considerable skepticism. 131 The exclusionary rule requires suppression of
the evidence from a particular search; it does not require suppression
of all evidence from the entire investigation. Particularly in the
knock-and-announce context, there is reason to believe that application of the exclusionary rule would not preclude prosecution, allowing
criminals to go free. By definition, in order to have a knock-andannounce violation, the police must have a warrant, as knock-andannounce is a requirement in executing a warrant. 132 A valid search
warrant can only be issued based on probable cause. 133 Thus, the police must have significant evidence of criminality prior to the search.
For example, a warrant to search for drugs is often based on an in130. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993) (standard 4-1.2(f): “[d]efense counsel
should not intentionally misrepresent matters of fact or law to the court”; standard 47.5(a): “[d]efense counsel should not knowingly offer false evidence, whether by documents,
tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to take reasonable remedial measures upon discovery of its falsity”).
131. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
132. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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formant’s or undercover officer’s testimony that they purchased
drugs (or observed drugs being purchased) from a specific individual
at a specific location. Although exclusion of the drugs found in an
improperly executed search might preclude prosecution based on the
specific quantity of drugs found in the home, it would certainly not
preclude prosecution for the previously transacted sale. 134 Of course,
in some cases, the exclusionary rule does have a significant impact. If
all, or virtually all, of the admissible evidence in a given case is excluded, then exclusion may well prevent a conviction and allow a
criminal to go free. But in most knock-and-announce cases there will
still be ample evidence on which to prosecute. In these cases, some
charges might have to be dropped, but a conviction on some counts,
or lesser counts may still be achieved. 135 Realistically, application of
the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations in most cases
would simply put the defendant and his counsel in a better position
to negotiate a favorable plea bargain.
Justice Scalia cites two different types of knock-and-announce
claims that would lead to extensive litigation “as never before”: “alleged failures to observe the rule, and claims that any asserted Richards justification for a no-knock entry had inadequate support.” 136
They will be addressed separately.
Alleged failures to observe the rule would generally fall into two
categories: complete failure to knock-and-announce or failure to wait
a reasonable period of time after knocking and announcing before entering forcibly. Obviously a motion to suppress on these grounds
could be made only if someone was in fact home and did not, in fact,
answer the door. (If no one were home, the police could claim that
they had knocked and announced whether they had or not and there
would be no one to contradict them. 137 ) In order to make such a motion, the occupants (or others on the premises) would have to testify
either that they did not answer the door because they did not hear
the police knock-and-announce or because they could not get to the
door before the police barged in. If the police testimony matched that
of the occupants, then the matter would be resolved. If the police tes-

134. I have personally prosecuted and defended cases where an individual was convicted of drug distribution without any evidence that drugs were found in their home or
indeed, even in their possession.
135. For articles and studies discussing the empirical impact of the exclusionary
rule, see the bibliographical essay in CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 213-15 (Peter Charles Hoffer &
N.E.H. Hull eds., 2006).
136. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166 (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)).
137. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67
U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996); see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi (1982)
(“Rule IV: Almost all police lie about whether they violated the Constitution in order to
convict guilty defendants.”).
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timony contradicted the occupants’ (for example, “we did knock on
the door and announce our presence, and then we waited a reasonable period of time before entering”), the trial judge would have to
determine the relative credibility of the witnesses, make findings of
fact, and, if she concluded that the police had properly announced
their presence, determine whether they had waited a reasonable period of time under the totality of the circumstances. 138 According to
Justice Scalia,
[W]hat constituted a “reasonable wait time” in a particular case,
(or, for that matter, how many seconds the police in fact waited), or
whether there was “reasonable suspicion” of the sort that would
invoke the Richards exceptions, is difficult for the trial court to determine and even more difficult for an appellate court to review. 139

E. The Alleged Difficulty of Resolving Knock-and-Announce Issues
Why does the Justice believe these issues would be “difficult for
the trial court to determine”? 140 Why would the issues be “even more
difficult for an appellate court to review”? 141 As for “how many seconds the police in fact waited,” 142 this is a simple factual determination, no more difficult for the trial court than any other fact based on
testimony. As for the legal issue involved (the reasonableness of the
wait time), the “totality of the circumstances” test is one that criminal courts use routinely to evaluate a variety of different issues, such
as whether consent to search was voluntarily given, 143 whether
anonymous tips furnish probable cause, 144 and whether a confession
was voluntary. 145 Justice Scalia offers no explanation of why the totality of the circumstances test of reasonableness would be particularly difficult to apply in the knock-and-announce context other than
to say that “it is not easy to determine precisely what officers must
do” because our “reasonable wait time” standard is “necessarily
vague.” 146 He appears to conclude that since the Supreme Court has
138. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
139. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. If the length of time that the police waited is an issue that is frequently in contention, the police could easily eliminate this issue by videotaping their execution of the
warrant, or at least the entry. This could be done through the use of a police videographer,
a small camera attached to one of the executing officer’s clothes, or, in some cases, a dashmounted video camera from a squad car. On the use of video cameras in police work, see
generally Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools of Justice,
23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771 (2005). Another simple option would be for
the police to use a stopwatch.
143. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
144. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
145. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000).
146. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163 (citing United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003)).
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enunciated a standard for Fourth Amendment violations that is difficult to apply, the lower courts should not have to apply it at all. 147
Ironically, Justice Scalia’s concern about the difficulty of applying
the standard appears to be limited to the context of a motion to suppress; he does not seem to be concerned about the lower courts having difficulty applying the exact same standard in the context of civil
damage claims, which he concludes are an effective remedy for
knock-and-announce violations. 148
The other legal issue that courts might have to determine does not
seem particularly difficult either. In Richards v. Wisconsin, the Court
held that if the police had reasonable suspicion “that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances,
would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence,” the police could dispense with the knock-and-announce requirement. 149 In many jurisdictions, as Justice Breyer notes in his
dissent, no-knock warrants are available if the police have reasons
that would justify dispensing with knock-and-announce. 150 In such
cases, the failure to knock-and-announce would be virtually impossible to challenge since the police could rely in good faith on the warrant. 151 In Richards, the Court discussed no-knock warrants approvingly: “The practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock warrants seems entirely reasonable when sufficient cause to do so can be
demonstrated ahead of time.” 152 Where the police have chosen to dispense with knocking and announcing without prior judicial approval,
they simply had to provide “some minimal level of objective justification” for their decision. 153 The “reasonable suspicion” standard prescribed by Richards is routinely applied by courts in a variety of contexts, such as evaluating the legality of Terry stops and frisks, 154
weapon searches of automobiles, 155 protective sweeps of residences,156
and temporary seizures of property. 157 It is unclear why Justice
Scalia believes the reasonable suspicion standard would be any
more difficult to apply in this context. 158 Logic suggests that it
would not be.
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See id.
Id. at 2167-68.
520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984).
520 U.S. at 396 n.7.
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034-35 (1983).
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990).
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983).
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006).
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Justice Scalia also claims that knock-and-announce motions to suppress are harder to resolve than other types of motions to suppress:
Unlike the warrant or Miranda requirements, compliance with
which is readily determined (either there was or was not a warrant; either the Miranda warning was given, or it was not) . . .
[knock-and-announce issues are] difficult for the trial court to determine and even more difficult for an appellate court to review. 159

Scrutiny of this argument quickly exposes its shortcomings. Determining compliance with the requirements of Miranda 160 is rarely
a simple matter of whether Miranda warnings were given. There are
frequently more complex issues involved in motions to suppress
statements under Miranda. First, there are the threshold issues of
whether Miranda warnings are required. Was the suspect in custody
when he made the statement? 161 Was the suspect subjected to interrogation prior to making the statement? 162 Then, once it has been determined that Miranda warnings should have been given, there is
frequently litigation over not only whether the warnings were given,
but whether they were adequately given 163 and understood. If the
Miranda warnings were given, there may be litigation over whether
the rights were knowingly and intelligently waived 164 or properly invoked. 165 On all these issues, the police officers and the suspect
rarely agree on the facts surrounding how a confession was obtained.
Thus, it is up to the judge to determine the relative credibility of the
witnesses and make findings of facts to support his or her conclusions of law. It cannot be seriously argued that the issues surrounding knock-and-announce are more difficult for courts to handle than
issues surrounding the admissibility of confessions.
Similarly, Justice Scalia’s claim that compliance with the Court’s
warrant requirements is “readily determined” is a conclusion without
a factual basis. 166 Motions to suppress based on Fourth Amendment
159. Id.
160. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
161. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 435 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1123 (1983).
162. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (stating that interrogation is
not only “express questioning,” but its “functional equivalent”—“any words or actions on the
part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect”); see also Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 526 (1987).
163. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 200-02 (1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S.
355, 358-59 (1981).
164. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
315 (1985); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1979).
165. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (ambiguous request for counsel);
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1984) (ambiguous request for counsel); Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (assertion of right to counsel); Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 100-02 (1975) (assertion of right to remain silent).
166. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006).
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search issues rarely are as easy as determining whether there was a
warrant, a fact which would be readily ascertainable. If there was
not a warrant for a search, then the courts must deal with the
threshold question of whether a search was conducted at all; that is,
whether there was a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the place
the evidence was observed. 167 This can involve difficult questions
such as whether the police used technology not generally in public
use 168 and whether the area observed was “curtilage” or “open
fields.” 169 Assuming there was a search without a warrant, the court
must determine whether the warrantless search or entry was justified by one of the ever-expanding list of exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as search incident to arrest, 170 exigent circumstance
searches, 171 certain vehicle and container searches, 172 or entry for
emergencies or public safety. 173 Another frequently contested issue is
whether consent was given for a warrantless search. 174 If there was
a warrant, the courts must still deal with the issues of whether the
warrant was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, 175
whether there was probable cause to support the warrant 176 (or the
police believed in good faith that there was), 177 whether the warrant
stated the place to be searched 178 and the items to be seized 179 with
sufficient particularity, and whether the police exceeded the scope of
the warrant during their search. 180 Can it credibly be maintained
that these issues are simpler to resolve than knock-and-announce issues? In short, the alleged difficulty of resolving knock-and-announce
issues in motions to suppress compared to other types of Fourth and
Fifth Amendment issues is not a convincing argument for declining to
apply the exclusionary rule to this category of Fourth Amendment violations.

167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
168. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
169. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987).
170. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 754-55 (1969).
171. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
172. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991); California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 390 (1985); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1977).
173. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006).
174. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
175. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979); Johnson v.
U.S., 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
176. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
177. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984).
178. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S.
498, 501 (1925).
179. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479 (1976); Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, 195 (1927).
180. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 817-18 (1982).
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F. The Danger of Over-Deterrence
Justice Scalia next argues that applying the exclusionary rule
(“the incongruent remedy”) would lead to “police officers’ refraining
from timely entry after knocking and announcing” because “officers
would be inclined to wait longer than the law requires” since it would
be hard for them to decide exactly how long they must wait. 181 Justice Scalia suggests that this unnecessary delay in entry would “produc[e] preventable violence against officers in some cases, and the
destruction of evidence in many others.” 182 Of course, if the police
have any indication of a threat to themselves or of the destruction of
evidence, they do not have to knock and announce at all. 183 If they
develop reasonable suspicion after they knock (from sounds they
hear from within the home, for example) they do not have to wait before entering. 184 What Justice Scalia apparently envisions is a situation where the police have no suspicion whatsoever of danger and
have no reason to believe that evidence will be destroyed, but the
danger exists nonetheless. Justice Scalia suggests that the police
should wait the absolute bare minimum amount of time permitted by
the Constitution—an amount of time that he has characterized as
“necessarily vague” 185 —and not a moment longer. What Justice
Scalia really seems to be saying is that knowledge that the exclusionary rule could be applied would cause the police to be too cautious in respecting the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens.
There are no other contexts where the Court has refused to apply
the exclusionary rule because it would cause the police to go beyond
constitutional requirements, although one could make a similar argument almost any time the exclusionary rule is applied. Under this
view, out of fear that evidence of a search will be excluded, police will
go beyond the absolute bare minimum in gathering evidence to support probable cause for a search warrant. The delay would increase
the danger that evidence would be hidden or destroyed. Similarly,
because an arrest without probable cause will lead to suppression of
fruit of the arrest (such as incriminating statements made by the
suspect or evidence found on the suspect), police will be reluctant to
arrest people and will wait until they have more than probable cause.
This would also leave dangerous suspects on the loose to commit
more crimes or perhaps to flee, never to be brought to justice. In
short, Justice Scalia concludes that the exclusionary rule is dangerous because it may cause officers to be too sensitive to Fourth

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006)
Id.
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
Id. at 396.
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163.
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Amendment concerns, thereby hampering their crime-fighting efforts. Assuming for the moment that Justice Scalia is right about the
risks to efficient law enforcement, there is another problem with this
argument. According to Justice Scalia, the appropriate remedy to
prevent knock-and-announce violations is a suit for civil damages. 186
If the threat of a civil suit is an equally effective deterrent to the police going into homes too early, why would it not also cause them to
hesitate too long? In other words, any effective deterrent could theoretically cause the police to err on the side of caution, thus this “cost”
is simply unavoidable. If Justice Scalia believes that the threat of a
civil suit would not cause police to hesitate beyond the minimum
time required to the same extent as exclusion of the evidence, then
that is essentially an admission that civil remedies are not as effective a deterrent.
G. The Need for Deterrence and the Effectiveness of the Exclusionary
Rule as a Deterrent
After considering the “social costs” of applying the exclusionary
rule, Justice Scalia then weighs these costs against the benefit of the
exclusionary rule: deterrence of police misconduct. 187 “Next to these
‘substantial social costs’ we must consider the deterrence benefits,
existence of which is a necessary condition for exclusion.” 188 According to the Justice, deterrence is not required because the police have
no good reason to violate knock-and-announce rules in the first place,
especially compared to other Fourth Amendment requirements that
they might violate:
To begin with, the value of deterrence depends upon the strength
of the incentive to commit the forbidden act. Viewed from this perspective, deterrence of knock-and-announce violations is not worth
a lot. Violation of the warrant requirement sometimes produces incriminating evidence that could not otherwise be obtained. But ignoring knock-and-announce can realistically be expected to achieve
absolutely nothing except the prevention of destruction of evidence
and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants of
the premises—dangers which, if there is even “reasonable suspicion” of their existence, suspend the knock-and-announce requirement anyway. Massive deterrence is hardly required. 189

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 2167-68.
Id. at 2166.
Id.
Id.
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There are a number of flaws with this argument. 190 One obvious
flaw is that over a decade after Wilson v. Arkansas 191 was decided,
during which both the exclusionary rule (in many jurisdictions) and
civil remedies (in all jurisdictions) were available, knock-andannounce violations are still occurring with some regularity. 192 So,
obviously there is some reason the police choose to violate knock-andannounce. Justice Scalia can think of only two reasons why the police
might ignore the requirement: prevention of destruction of evidence
and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance. 193 But, as Justice
Scalia himself notes, if the police have a reasonable suspicion of either of these dangers, knock-and-announce is suspended. 194 So, logically, there must be some reason why the police violate knock-andannounce when they do not have a reasonable suspicion of danger.
Justice Breyer offers one possibility: “[S]ome government officers will
find it easier, or believe it less risky, to proceed with what they consider a necessary search immediately and without the requisite constitutional (say, warrant or knock-and-announce) compliance.” 195
Another, less innocuous possibility is that police may believe that
breaking in and catching a suspect unaware (without a chance to
“collect oneself,” as Justice Scalia characterized it 196 ) will give the police an investigatory edge. Feeling overwhelmed and vulnerable, a
suspect might make spontaneous admissions, or, if arrested after the
search yields incriminating evidence, the suspect, still reeling from
being caught off guard, might be more inclined to cooperate and confess. Other police may be more concerned with exercising their authority than they are about the evidentiary issues and may have little regard for the personal dignity of those whom they investigate.
Professor Gerald Uelman raises another possible incentive for police to violate knock-and-announce. Responding to Justice Scalia’s
argument that the police have no evidentiary incentive for knockand-announce violations, he notes that “[w]ith an arrest warrant,
however, the incentive may actually be quite different. An unan190. One problem with Justice Scalia’s argument is that it assumes that the only justification or value of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police misconduct—a debatable
point, but one which has been debated at great length by other scholars, so I will not discuss it here. See supra note 135. For articles discussing the merits of the exclusionary rule,
or lack thereof, see ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 124-30 (2003) (bibliographic essay listing leading articles) and LONG, supra note 135, at 211-13 (bibliographic essay listing leading articles); see also generally 1 LAFAVE, supra note 47, §§ 1.1-1.2 (summarizing
the debate surrounding the exclusionary rule).
191. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
192. See supra note 21.
193. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2165 (majority opinion).
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nounced entry can expand the scope of the permissible search.”197
Similar to a search warrant, the police are required to knock and announce their purpose when executing an arrest warrant at a private
home. 198 If the suspect surrenders himself at the front door, the police have no authority to search the home, other than perhaps a cursory search around the entry. 199 However, if the police ignore knockand-announce and enter the home to arrest the suspect within, in an
upstairs bedroom for example, then the police can get a free search of
everything in plain view on the way in and out, plus additional areas
incident to arrest, or as part of a protective sweep. 200 Although Hudson did not specifically state that it would apply to arrest warrants,
according to Professor Uelman, there is “little hope of limiting the rationale of Hudson to search warrants.” 201
Clearly, recognition that the tendency to abuse power is inevitable
in any organization which has authority over the citizenry was one of
the underlying bases for both Fourth Amendment protections and
the application of the exclusionary rule to enforce them. These
abuses are inevitably most often applied to those whom the police
may view as undesirable—for example, criminal suspects or members of minority groups. Justice Scalia not only discounts these possibilities, but implies that he does not care whether the police are deterred by civil suits. 202 As he makes clear, even if the threat of suit
has no deterrent effect, he would still not be willing to apply the
exclusionary rule:
It seems to us not even true, as Hudson contends, that without
suppression there will be no deterrence of knock-and-announce
violations at all. Of course even if this assertion were accurate, it
would not necessarily justify suppression. Assuming (as the assertion must) that civil suit is not an effective deterrent, one can
think of many forms of police misconduct that are similarly “undeterred.” When, for example, a confessed suspect in the killing of a
police officer, arrested (along with incriminating evidence) in a
lawful warranted search, is subjected to physical abuse at the station house, would it seriously be suggested that the evidence must
be excluded, since that is the only “effective deterrent”? And what,
other than civil suit, is the “effective deterrent” of police violation
of an already-confessed suspect’s Sixth Amendment rights by denying him prompt access to counsel? Many would regard these violated rights as more significant than the right not to be intruded
upon in one’s nightclothes—and yet nothing but “ineffective” civil
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Uelman, supra note 118, at 62.
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
Id.; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
Uelman, supra note 118, at 62.
See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166-67 (2006).
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suit is available as a deterrent. And the police incentive for those
violations is arguably greater than the incentive for disregarding
the knock-and-announce rule. 203

The gist of Justice Scalia’s argument is that we cannot or do not
deter all forms of police misconduct through use of the exclusionary
rule, so why should we bother to apply the rule to deter this particular form of police misconduct, which is not even that serious? 204 To
bolster his position, Justice Scalia provides two examples of police
misconduct where the exclusionary rules do not apply. 205 In the first
example, a confessed suspect who has killed a police officer is arrested, and during a lawful warranted search the police find additional incriminating evidence. 206 The police then abuse the suspect at
the stationhouse. 207
Let’s look at this example more closely. It appears that the police
have an airtight case: a lawful confession, plus corroborating physical evidence. 208 According to Justice Scalia, the police, nevertheless,
still have an “arguably greater” incentive to physically abuse the
suspect while in police custody. 209 But the Justice has just stated that
“the value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive
to commit the forbidden act.” 210 The normal incentive for the police to
violate the Constitution is presumably the desire to gather incriminating evidence to convict criminals, what the Court has referred to
as the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” 211 Indeed, Justice Scalia notes that violating the “warrant requirement sometimes
produces incriminating evidence that could not otherwise be obtained.” 212 This suggests that he believes that the incentive to violate
the Constitution is to gather evidence. Justice Scalia also seems to be
alluding to another incentive—the desire to beat a suspect out of anger, frustration, or vengeance, even though it will not advance the
investigation in any way and could surely hinder it. Justice Scalia
does not account for the strong disincentives to abuse a suspect, such
as the credibility problems this will create for the officers involved,
the risk of personal liability, the loss of employment, and the disciplinary and criminal sanctions that may follow.
Is a jury likely to believe the word of police officers who physically
attack a suspect? Will they believe that the confession allegedly ob203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2167.
Id. at 2166-67.
Id. at 2167.
Id. at 2166.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
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tained before the beating was truly voluntarily given and that the
evidence was found where it was claimed to be found? Would not a
jury or judge be suspicious of the actions of a police department that
would allow a suspect in custody to be physically abused? Would the
police really run the risk of losing the prosecution of a vicious criminal just to have a chance to beat him up? Justice Scalia seems to
think so. Yet he can not seem to imagine any dark motives the police
might have to violate knock-and-announce. In a confusing part of the
opinion, Justice Scalia refers to the highly professional nature of the
modern police force and concludes that the exclusionary rule is unnecessary because police are unlikely to violate citizen’s rights. 213 It
is as if any argument that would bolster the conclusion that
knock-and-announce is not significant will be cited without either
analysis or even concern that it might contradict other aspects of
the opinion’s reasoning.
There is another problem with this example. Justice Scalia suggests that if a civil suit is, as Hudson argued, an ineffective remedy
for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule, then it must also be
an ineffective remedy for police abuse of prisoners. 214 There are obvious differences in these two situations which might make a civil
remedy more effective in one versus the other. The main difference is
that when the police physically abuse a suspect, there is physical
evidence; it is not simply a matter of the testimony of the suspect
that his or her rights were violated. The victim of police brutality can
prove the abuse through concrete factual evidence. Second, it is far
easier to prove damages in a police brutality case as opposed to a
knock-and-announce case. It is hard to put a monetary value on a
violation of privacy, and a jury is unlikely to be sympathetic to a
criminal suspect’s hurt feelings. Thus, any damages would likely be
nominal and of little interest to private attorneys. In contrast, damage awards in police brutality cases are frequently substantial. 215
While there would undoubtedly be plaintiffs’ attorneys eager to represent a physically abused suspect, few attorneys would as readily
agree to pursue a knock-and-announce civil suit.

213. Id. at 2168.
214. Id. at 2166-67.
215. For example, in the infamous Rodney King case in Los Angeles, a jury in 1994
awarded Mr. King $3.8 million in compensatory damages. Rodney King Is Awarded $3.8
Million, NY TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at A14. The King beating, memorably caught on videotape, precipitated major race riots when the officers involved were acquitted of police brutality charges on April 29, 1992. Riots in Los Angeles, NY TIMES, May 2, 1992, at A1, l.
More recently, in the high profile case of Abner Louima, the Haitian immigrant who was
abused by members of the New York Police Department, the case was settled out of court
in July 2001 for $8.75 million. City Settles Suit in Louima Torture, NY TIMES, Jul. 13,
2001, at A1.
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Justice Scalia asks, “[W]ould it seriously be suggested that the
evidence must be excluded” in this instance (the beaten suspect)? 216
Although the answer is obviously “no,” the question is irrelevant. The
exclusionary rule is clearly not appropriate in this instance because
the evidence was obtained lawfully, prior to the beating. 217 Since the
situations being compared are not comparable, the use of the example is misleading.
The second example given by Justice Scalia is “police violation of
an already-confessed suspect’s Sixth Amendment rights by denying
him prompt access to counsel.” 218 It is not clear exactly what the Justice is referring to. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
attach until adversary judicial criminal proceedings have commenced 219 —typically, when a person has been formally charged with
a crime. After this point, the police may not deliberately elicit incriminating information from the accused in the absence of defense
counsel. 220 If the police deliberately elicit incriminating information,
the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule does apply—the statements
are inadmissible. 221 Justice Breyer apparently also found this example confusing. Justice Breyer thought Justice Scalia was referring to
a situation where a “suspect confesses, then police apparently arrest
him, take him to [sic] station, and refuse to tell him of his right to
counsel.” 222 Of course, informing a suspect of his right to counsel is
part of the Miranda right to counsel to prevent compelled selfincrimination. 223 This right to counsel is generally considered separate from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 224 Failure to inform
a suspect of his Miranda right to counsel would render any subsequent statement in response to questioning inadmissible. 225
So what exactly is the police incentive to deny prompt access to
counsel to which Justice Scalia refers? It cannot be to continue to try
to extract information from the suspect which would inevitably be
suppressed. The only other possibility would be that the police deny
prompt access to counsel simply because it would interfere with their
dominion over suspects in custody. There is no explanation of why
Justice Scalia feels the incentive to deny prompt access to counsel is
“arguably greater” than the incentive to violate knock-and-
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Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977).
Id.
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2176 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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announce. 226 According to Justice Scalia, violating knock-andannounce could be a life-or-death matter. 227 What equivalent value is
there to the police to refuse access to counsel? And why would a
highly professional police force that respects citizens’ rights (as Justice Scalia characterizes modern officers) 228 want to deny this right,
especially when they already had enough evidence for the prosecutor
to file formal charges? Justice Scalia does not address these questions.
H. The Adequacy of Other Deterrents
After explaining why there is little need for deterrence of knockand-announce violations and little deterrence value in using the exclusionary rule, Justice Scalia next explains that there are already
adequate deterrents to knock-and-announce violations: “[T]he extant
deterrences against them are substantial.” 229 The primary deterrents
he refers to are civil damage suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for suits
against state officers and municipalities) 230 and Bivens actions (for
suits against federal officers). 231 “As far as we know, civil liability is
an effective deterrent here, as we have assumed it is in other contexts.” 232 Here, Justice Scalia seems to be borrowing from Judge Posner’s opinion in United States v. Langford: 233
[W]e hold that violation of the [knock-and-announce] rule does not
authorize exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to the ensuing
search. . . . There are contrary decisions. . . . The concern that
animates those decisions is that unless evidence obtained in a
search that violates the knock-and-announce rule is excluded,
there will be no deterrent to such violations. But that is not true
now that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Bivens doctrine have made tort
damages an effective remedy for constitutional violations by federal or state law enforcement officers. 234

Judge Posner did not offer any support for the proposition that
tort damages are an effective remedy; 235 Justice Scalia at least
tried. 236 However, the case cited by Justice Scalia for the proposition
226. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167.
227. Id. at 2165.
228. Id. at 2168.
229. Id.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
231. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
232. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68 (citing Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70
(2001)).
233. 314 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2002).
234. Id. at 894-95 (citations omitted).
235. For two useful critiques of United States v. Langford, see Amy Garzon, Comment, United States v. Langford, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 353 (2003), and Loly Garcia Tor,
Note, Mandating Exclusion for Violations of the Knock and Announce Rule, 83 B.U. L. REV.
853 (2003).
236. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68.

692

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:659

that civil damages are an effective remedy is not relevant to the issue
in Hudson. The case of Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko addressed whether Bivens actions should be extended to allow an inmate to sue a private contractor operating a halfway house on behalf
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons when the inmate alleged that he
had been treated in a cruel and unusual way. 237 The Court held that
they should not. 238 Not only did this case not involve a choice of
whether to apply the exclusionary rule, it did not even involve police
investigation of a crime or even police misconduct.
Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court simply to “assume” that
civil remedies are an adequate substitute for the exclusionary rule,
without requiring any evidence that they are? Is it a reasonable assumption, supported by logic and common sense? Professors Christopher Slobogin and Charles Whitebread cite several reasons why
this assumption is dubious, including the relative rarity of damages
actions. 239 In addition, according to these scholars,
[u]nder current law, a damages suit is not feasible when damages
are negligible, as is the case with many Fourth Amendment (and
other constitutional) violations, and the victim poor, as are most
persons investigated by the police. Even if damages are sizeable, a
civil suit is unlikely to be attractive; since constitutional violations
will often be the result of idiosyncratic misconduct rather than
government policy, the (often judgment proof) officer will usually
be the only legitimate defendant, at least in state litigation. Moreover, most individuals with possible damages claims will be
charged with a criminal offense; because they will be incarcerated
or feel estopped by some notion of “unclean hands” they will seldom bring a civil suit. 240

These authors also note the proven impact of the exclusionary rule in
leading to changes in police training. 241
Ironically, among the class of people who are victims of knockand-announce violations, those who would potentially benefit from
the exclusionary rule (those against whom incriminating evidence is
found in the subsequent search) are the least likely to take advantage of the civil remedies available. It is not just the difficulty of
bringing suit while incarcerated or a notion of “unclean hands” that
is likely to prevent guilty victims from filing suit. These individuals,
who most likely will become criminally accused shortly after the
search is completed, have distinct disincentives to sue the police offi237. 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001).
238. Id.
239. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 58-59
(Found. Press 4th ed. 2000).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 59.
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cers and the government that the innocent victims of knock-andannounce violations do not have. The fate of the accused criminal depends, in large measure, on the goodwill of (or at least a lack of
strong negative attitude by) the police and prosecutors—local government officials. Favorable charging decisions and plea bargains are
matters of discretion for these officials, and an accused criminal
would be foolish to antagonize the police and government by suing
them at a time when his fate was in their hands. Even if the accused
criminal could wait until after the case had been resolved before filing suit, there are still matters of parole and probation decisions,
place of incarceration, treatment by prison guards, and the like. Law
enforcement officers, including corrections officers, are a brotherhood, and there are myriad ways they can make a troublesome defendants or prisoner’s life difficult. Retaliation and harassment
would be easy for the police to undertake and extremely difficult to
prove. For example, the Supreme Court recently decided that police
may conduct suspicionless searches of parolees at any time, an unprecedented invitation to police harassment. 242 The Court has also
decided that a citizen can be arrested for the slightest infraction
(even a fine-only offense such as a seat-belt violation) and subjected
to a search of their person incident to arrest, an inventory search of
their belongings, and detention for forty-eight hours. 243 The Court
will not consider the subjective motivation of the officers in such a
case, so an officer bent on harassing an individual could do so with
little fear of being second-guessed. 244 In short, an accused or convicted criminal would have strong incentives to avoid the unwanted
attention from law enforcement that a civil lawsuit might bring. The
majority fails to account for this.
Justice Breyer strongly refuted the majority’s assumption that
civil damages are adequate, calling it, in unusually direct language,
“a support-free assumption.” 245 Justice Breyer noted that
the majority, like Michigan and the United States, has failed to
cite a single reported case in which a plaintiff has collected more
than nominal damages solely as a result of a knock-and-announce
violation. Even Michigan concedes that, “in cases like the present
one . . . , damages may be virtually non-existent.” 246
242. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006).
243. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); see also Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
244. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
245. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2175 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 2174 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 35, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct.
2159 (2006) (No.4-1360)). The United States submitted a brief and argued in support
of Michigan’s position that the exclusionary rule should not apply. Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159
(2006) (No. 4-1360).
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Justice Scalia responded to the argument that it would be difficult to find a lawyer to take on a case where minimal damages
would be involved:
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) answers this objection. Since some civil-rights
violations would yield damages too small to justify the expense of
litigation, Congress has authorized attorney’s fees for civil-rights
plaintiffs. This remedy was unavailable in the heydays of our exclusionary-rule jurisprudence, because it is tied to the availability
of a cause of action. For years after Mapp, “very few lawyers would
even consider representation of persons who had civil rights claims
against the police,” but now “much has changed. Citizens and lawyers are much more willing to seek relief in the courts for police
misconduct.” The number of public-interest law firms and lawyers
who specialize in civil-rights grievances has greatly expanded. 247

Although Justice Scalia’s general observations may arguably be
true, he has overlooked some issues specific to knock-and-announce
that cast doubt on the premise that lawyers and citizens are likely to
sue for damages for such violations. For example, although attorney’s
fees are available for civil rights plaintiffs, they are not available to
all plaintiffs equally. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) limits
the recovery of attorney’s fees to 150% of actual damages in any suit
brought by a prisoner. 248 If the damages from a knock-and-announce
violation are too small to justify the expense of a lawsuit, then the
prospect of multiplying those damages one and a half times for attorney’s fees is still unlikely to entice many attorneys to take the case. 249

247. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167 (majority opinion) (quoting MICHAEL AVERY, DAVID
RUDOVSKY & KAREN BLUM, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION v (West 3d ed.
2005) (second quote)) (citations omitted). The reference to the Avery, Rudovsky, and Blum
text is another example of Justice Scalia’s citation of a scholarly work on a specific point in
support of a broader proposition not supported by the authors. See id. David Rudovsky, a
nationally prominent criminal defense and civil rights attorney and a Senior Fellow at the
University of Pennyslvania Law School, has criticized the exceptions to the exclusionary
rule and the limited nature of civil rights damages and injunctive relief. See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies,
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199. Mr. Rudovsky, who agreed to be quoted for this Article, states,
“[T]he cite to our book is disingenuous. The fact that there may be some remedies for police
misconduct in some contexts does not begin to answer the question as to remedies for
knock and announce violations. Particularly where contraband is found, I can state quite
categorically there are no realistic remedies.” E-mail from David Rudovsky, Senior Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to author (Oct. 19, 2006, 8:36 EST) (on file
with author).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2000).
249. See, e.g., Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that
when prisoner’s suit based on Fourth Amendment violation yielded $1.00 in nominal damages, the PLRA limited the award of attorney’s fees to $1.50; district court’s award of attorney’s fees in amount of $9680 was reversed); see also Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660 (6th
Cir. 2001) (reversing award of $34,493.72 in attorney’s fees when prisoner was awarded
$426 in damages and PLRA limited recoverable attorney’s fees at $629).
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Also, before consulting a lawyer about pursuing a knock-andannounce suit, citizens have to know or at least suspect that their
rights have been violated. The average citizen knows that the police
are not supposed to physically abuse them; they may not know that
the police are required to announce their presence and wait a reasonable time when executing a search warrant. Police television
shows frequently feature SWAT teams breaking into suspects’ homes
unannounced; the average American may assume this is standard
operating procedure. The exclusionary remedy is effective because
the criminally accused, regardless of their ability to pay, are guaranteed counsel to closely scrutinize the actions of the police, explain to
defendants their rights, and help them to exercise their rights. Although beyond the scope of their representation, a few criminal defense attorneys (especially those in private practice) might inform
their clients about the possibility of filing suit. But the average public defender or appointed counsel can hardly be expected to do so,
given the limited time they are likely to have to spend with their clients. As there is no comparable cadre of attorneys who are paid by
the government to monitor the actions of the police with an eye toward
filing civil damage suits for constitutional violations, many innocent
victims of knock-and-announce violations may never get legal advice.
Justice Scalia fails to address another obvious point. Bivens suits
have been available since 1971, 250 and § 1983 claims have been available since Monroe v. Pape 251 was decided in 1961. If the threat of civil
suits were as effective a deterrent as Justice Scalia suggests, 252 one
would assume that police violations of constitutional rights should
have been virtually eliminated by now. But Justice Scalia offers no
empirical evidence that the threat of being sued has deterred the police or resulted in a measurable diminution of serious violations of
the rights of criminal suspects.
A popular criminal procedure treatise treats the notion that civil
damages are an adequate substitute for the exclusionary rule succinctly:
In sum, although civil actions are sometimes available—and successful—as a remedy in damages for some specific instances of especially egregious police misconduct, experience has demonstrated
that such civil lawsuits are too sporadic and idiosyncratic to serve
to effectively prevent law enforcement officers from engaging in
unconstitutional activity or to otherwise remedy this problem. 253

250. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
251. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
252. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
253. WEAVER, ABRAMSON, BURKOFF & HANCOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
242 (2004).
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Another commentator, focusing specifically on the use of civil actions in the knock-and-announce context, concludes, “various legal
hurdles and limitations make lodging a sustainable claim for breach
of the ‘knock and announce’ rule an arduous proposition.” 254
I. The Professionalism of Modern Police Forces
Lacking any hard evidence to suggest that civil damages deter police, Justice Scalia offers an alternative argument: the exclusionary
rule is no longer necessary because “modern police forces are staffed
with professionals.” 255
Another development over the past half-century that deters
civil-rights violations is the increasing professionalism of police
forces, including a new emphasis on internal police discipline. . . .
[W]e now have increasing evidence that police forces across the
United States take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously.
There have been “wide-ranging reforms in the education, training,
and supervision of police officers.” Numerous sources are now
available to teach officers and their supervisors what is required of
them under this Court’s cases, how to respect constitutional guarantees in various situations, and how to craft an effective regime
for internal discipline. 256

There can be no question that modern police forces are, by and
large, more professional, better trained, and more concerned with the
constitutional rights of citizens than their predecessors. What Justice
Scalia overlooks is why this change has occurred. The single largest
driving force behind this trend has been the exclusion of evidence
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments’ exclusionary
rules. 257 Concern over losing valid incriminating evidence in a sup254. E. Martin Estrada, A Toothless Tiger in the Constitutional Jungle: The “Knock
and Announce Rule” and the Sacred Castle Door, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 79
(2005). See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 247, 284-86 (1988).
255. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168.
256. Id. (quoting SAMUEL E. WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM 51 (1993)).
257. Samuel Walker, Thanks for Nothing, Nino, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at 5, available at 2006 WLNR 10986191. Professor Walker made this point in an editorial shortly after Hudson was announced, accusing Justice Scalia of violating Walker’s “intellectual integrity” because “[Scalia] twisted [Walker’s] main argument to reach a conclusion the exact
opposite of what [he] spelled out in [Taming the System] and other studies.” Id. He continued on to say:
Scalia’s opinion suggests that the results I highlighted have sufficiently removed the need for an exclusionary rule to act as a judicial-branch watchdog
over the police. I have never said or even suggested such a thing. To the contrary, I have argued that the results reinforce the Supreme Court’s continuing
importance in defining constitutional protections for individual rights and requiring the appropriate remedies for violations, including the exclusion of evidence.
Id.
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pression motion, thereby allowing a criminal to go free, is the reason
that police departments “teach officers and their supervisors what is
required of them under this Court’s cases” and “how to respect constitutional guarantees in various situations.” 258
However professional modern police forces may be, it is clear that
the police will continue to press the constitutional boundaries in
their understandable drive to arrest and convict criminals. The police
monitor Supreme Court decisions in the criminal procedure area the
way accountants monitor changes to the Internal Revenue Code.
They are constantly looking for any advantage or loophole. Good examples of this can be seen in the cases of Oregon v. Elstad 259 and
Missouri v. Seibert. 260 In Elstad, the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment does not require “the suppression of a confession, made
after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely
because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned
admission from the defendant.” 261 “[T]he officer’s initial failure to
warn” in Elstad was characterized in Seibert as an “oversight” and “a
good-faith Miranda mistake.” 262 Yet in direct response to Elstad,
many police departments dramatically changed their interrogations
tactics to intentionally omit Miranda warnings during initial interrogations. 263 This disturbing trend was later addressed by the Court:
The technique of interrogating in successive, unwarned and
warned phases raises a new challenge to Miranda. Although we
have no statistics on the frequency of this practice, it is not confined to Rolla, Missouri. An officer of that police department testified that the strategy of withholding Miranda warnings until after
interrogating and drawing out a confession was promoted not only
by his own department, but by a national police training organization and other departments in which he had worked. Consistently
with the officer’s testimony, the Police Law Institute, for example,
instructs that “officers may conduct a two-stage interrogation. . . .
At any point during the pre-Miranda interrogation, usually after
arrestees have confessed, officers may then read the Miranda
warnings and ask for a waiver. If the arrestees waive their
Miranda rights, officers will be able to repeat any subsequent incriminating statements later in court.” The upshot of all this advice is a question-first practice of some popularity, as one can see
from the reported cases describing its use, sometimes in obedience
to department policy. 264

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168.
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
542 U.S. 600 (2004).
470 U.S. at 303.
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 614-15.
See id. at 609-11.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The police procedures adopted by many police departments in response to Elstad would have subjected them to potential liability in §
1983 civil suits because they encouraged clear constitutional violations. 265 The police recognized they were violating Miranda because
they knew any incriminating statements made during pre-Miranda
interrogations would be suppressed. As Justice Kennedy commented
in concurrence in Seibert, “[t]he police used a two-step questioning
technique based on a deliberate violation of Miranda.” 266
The Seibert case demonstrates that the police will adopt whatever
tactics they can aggressively implement if they can increase their
conviction rate and not be overturned on appeal, even to the point of
intentionally violating constitutional mandates, without regard to
the potential for civil damage suits. 267 A similar change in police tactics can be expected in light of Hudson. Of course, police departments
will still provide training on knock-and-announce consistent with
Wilson, Banks, Ramirez, and Richards, thereby eliminating the risk
of municipal liability suggested by Justice Scalia as an additional deterrent, 268 but this training will be undoubtedly be supplemented
with an explanation that violations of knock-and-announce no longer
will result in suppression of evidence. It will be up to individual police officers to weigh the risks of a civil lawsuit and internal discipline against whatever perceived advantage they may derive from
violating knock-and-announce. This is an invitation to abuse by unscrupulous officers. Indeed, by citing the salutary effects of violating
knock-and-announce (protecting the lives of officers and avoiding the
destruction of evidence), Justice Scalia almost seems to be encouraging violations of knock-and-announce. 269
IV. PLACING HUDSON IN THE CONTEXT OF SUPREME COURT
EXCLUSIONARY RULE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Trend of the Court to Minimize the Potential for Police
Abuses and Limit the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule
Justice Scalia’s lack of concern about the incentive for unscrupulous officers to violate knock-and-announce reflects a deep division
between the attitudes of the most conservative and most liberal factions of the Court toward the police, a division that can be seen in
numerous cases. The more liberal wing, led by Justice Stevens and
including Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, is far more concerned about
265. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
266. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
267. See generally id.
268. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006) (“Failure to teach and enforce
constitutional requirements exposes municipalities to financial liability.”)
269. Id. at 2166.
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officers acting in bad faith; the more conservative Justices, led by
Justice Scalia and currently including Justices Thomas and Alito and
Chief Justice Roberts, are more inclined to tolerate broad police discretion if it will result in greater police efficiency and higher conviction rates. 270 The more centrist Justices—Justice Souter, Justice
Kennedy, and recently retired Justice O’Connor—have tended to be
the swing votes in these cases. 271 This divide is by no means a new
phenomenon. The issue of balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the potential incentives for police misconduct, especially where the admissibility of incriminating evidence rule is involved, has been a recurring theme on the Court for decades.
Consider the dissent of Justice Byron White in Rakas v. Illinois. 272
The case concerned the issue of who had standing to raise Fourth
Amendment violations—specifically, whether passengers in a car
that was illegally searched had standing to raise the issue of the illegal search even though they did not own the car.273 If they had standing, then the evidence would be suppressed under the exclusionary
rule; if not, the evidence would not be suppressed despite the illegality. 274 The Court held that passengers had no standing. 275 Justice
White, in dissent, commented,
[T]he ruling today undercuts the force of the exclusionary rule in
the one area in which its use is most certainly justified—the deterrence of bad-faith violations of the Fourth Amendment. This decision invites police to engage in patently unreasonable searches
every time an automobile contains more than one occupant. . . .
Of course, most police officers will decline the Court’s invitation
and will continue to do their jobs as best they can in accord with
the Fourth Amendment. But the very purpose of the Bill of Rights
was to answer the justified fear that governmental agents cannot
be left totally to their own devices, and the Bill of Rights is enforceable in the courts because human experience teaches that not
all such officials will otherwise adhere to the stated precepts. . . .
In the rush to limit the applicability of the exclusionary rule
somewhere, anywhere, the Court ignores precedent, logic and

270. Christopher E. Smith, Michael A. McCall & Madhavi M. McCall, Criminal Justice
and the 2005-2006 United States Supreme Court Term, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 495 (1997);
see JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007).
271. See sources cited supra note 270.
272. 439 U.S. 128, 156 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined in this
dissent by Justice Stevens, the only current member of the Court who participated in the
Rakas decision. Id.
273. Id. at 129-30 (majority opinion).
274. See id. at 133-34.
275. Id. at 128.
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common sense to exclude the rule’s operation from situations in
which, paradoxically, it is justified and needed. 276

Justice White cautioned that “some deterrent is needed” because
“[s]ome policemen simply do act in bad faith, even if for understandable ends.” 277 Justice White concluded that, “[a]fter this decision, police will have little to lose by unreasonably searching.” 278 These
words apply with equal force to the decision in Hudson.
The trend to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule accelerated in
the mid-1980s, with the Court creating two new exceptions to the
rule: the “good-faith” exception 279 and the “inevitable discovery” exception, 280 causing Justice Brennan to bemoan the Court’s “zealous
efforts to emasculate the exclusionary rule” 281 and “the Court’s gradual but determined strangulation of the rule.” 282 Dissenting in Leon,
Justice Stevens expressed concern about the incentives the Court
was creating for the police:
Today’s decisions do grave damage to that deterrent function
[served by the exclusionary rule]. . . .
. . . The Court’s approach—which, in effect, encourages the
police to seek a warrant even if they know the existence of
probable cause is doubtful—can only lead to an increased number of constitutional violations. 283

The trend to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule was furthered
with the appointment of Justice Scalia to the Court in 1986. A review
of leading cases since that year reveals that he and his conservative
brethren consistently discount the potential for police abuses. For
example, serious concerns about police incentives to violate the
Fourth Amendment were expressed in the 1988 case of Murray v.
United States. 284 In Murray, the police had unlawfully searched a
private warehouse without a warrant and observed contraband
(bales of marijuana). 285 The police then sought and received a warrant to search the warehouse, not mentioning in the warrant application that they had already been inside and observed the drugs. 286 The
issue was whether the evidence seized during the search pursuant to
the warrant should be suppressed because of the prior illegal en276. Id. at 168-69 (White, J., dissenting).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984).
280. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
281. Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
282. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 973-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
285. Id. at 533.
286. Id.
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try. 287 The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Scalia, held that
the taint of the illegal search was erased by the subsequent lawful
search; thus, the drugs, although found initially during an illegal
search, were admissible because they were seized pursuant to a lawful “independent source.” 288 The dissent, written by Justice Marshall
and joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor, expressed grave concern over the incentives the new “independent source” exception to
the exclusionary rule would create for the police:
[A]dmission of the evidence “reseized” during the second search
severely undermines the deterrence function of the exclusionary
rule. Indeed, admission in these cases affirmatively encourages illegal searches. The incentives for such illegal conduct are clear.
Obtaining a warrant is inconvenient and time consuming. Even
when officers have probable cause to support a warrant application, therefore, they have an incentive first to determine whether
it is worthwhile to obtain a warrant. Probable cause is much less
than certainty, and many “confirmatory” searches will result in the
discovery that no evidence is present, thus saving the police the
time and trouble of getting a warrant. If contraband is discovered,
however, the officers may later seek a warrant to shield the evidence from the taint of the illegal search. The police thus know in advance that they have little to lose and much to gain by forgoing the
bother of obtaining a warrant and undertaking an illegal search. 289

Justice Scalia dismissed this concern:
We see the incentives differently. An officer with probable cause
sufficient to obtain a search warrant would be foolish to enter the
premises first in an unlawful manner. By doing so, he would risk
suppression of all evidence on the premises, both seen and unseen,
since his action would add to the normal burden of convincing a
magistrate that there is probable cause the much more onerous
burden of convincing a trial court that no information gained from
the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officers’ decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate’s decision to grant it. 290

Justice Scalia did not consider the possibility that the police would
simply neglect to mention the first illegal search to the magistrate or
in their police report, so the defense would not have the information
on which to raise a suppression motion with the trial court. But if the officers were unethical enough to engage in a search without a warrant,
why would he expect them to be honest about their illegal behavior?
Two years later, in Alabama v. White, the conservative majority
(including Justices Scalia and Thomas) found that an anonymous tip
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 535.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 546-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 540 (majority opinion).
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was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry
stop. 291 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
argued in dissent that the ruling gave the police incentive to fabricate anonymous tips:
[U]nder the Court’s holding, every citizen is subject to being seized
and questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the
warrantless stop was based on an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed. Fortunately, the vast majority of those in our law enforcement community would not adopt
such a practice. But the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect the citizen from the overzealous and unscrupulous officer as
well as from those who are conscientious and truthful. This decision makes a mockery of that protection. 292

The following year, in California v. Hodari D., the Court considered the issue of what constituted a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. 293 Hodari D. had fled on foot when he saw
the police approaching. 294 The police instructed him to stop and began pursuing him. 295 During the pursuit, Hodari D. abandoned some
drugs, which the police recovered. 296 Hodari D. argued that he had
been seized at the moment the police pursued him and instructed
him to stop (even though he did not obey the instruction) and that
this seizure was illegal, as it was not based on probable cause. 297 If
the Court agreed that he had been seized, the evidence that Hodari
D. had dropped while fleeing from the police would have been subject
to suppression under the exclusionary rule, 298 but the Court did not
rule this way. Rather, the majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia
and joined by Justices Souter and Kennedy, held that a “show of authority” alone was not a seizure, and therefore the police officers’ action in instructing Hodari D. to stop and chasing him were not subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 299
The dissent, written by Justice Stevens, raised concerns about the
incentives for abuse that this would create for police:
In an airport setting, may a drug enforcement agent now approach
a group of passengers with his gun drawn, announce a “baggage
search,” and rely on the passengers’ reactions to justify his investigative stops? The holding of today’s majority fails to recognize the
291. 496 U.S. 325, 326-27 (1990). For a discussion of the implication of Hudson in the
Terry stop context, see Part V.C.
292. Id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
293. 499 U.S. 621, 623 (1991).
294. Id. at 622-23.
295. Id. at 623, 626.
296. Id. at 623.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 623-24.
299. Id. at 629.
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coercive and intimidating nature of such behavior and creates a
rule that may allow such behavior to go unchecked.

....
It is too early to know the consequences of the Court’s holding.
If carried to its logical conclusion, it will encourage unlawful displays of force that will frighten countless innocent citizens into
surrendering whatever privacy rights they may still have. . . . Today’s qualification of the Fourth Amendment means that innocent
citizens may remain “secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures” only at the discretion of the police. 300

More recently, in United States v. Patane, the Court had to “decide
whether a failure to give a suspect the warnings prescribed by
Miranda v. Arizona requires suppression of the physical fruits of the
suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements.” 301 The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, held that suppression was not required. 302 The dissenters,
in an opinion by Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, again expressed concern about the incentives this would provide for the police to violate citizens’ constitutional rights:
The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive
for the police to omit Miranda warnings, before custodial interrogation. In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda, the plurality
adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule
in that case.
....
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when there
may be physical evidence to be gained. 303

B. A Trio of Cases: Leading Cases Cited by the Majority in Hudson
v. Michigan
Hudson is consistent with the trend of the conservative wing of
the Court in recent years to minimize the impact and applicability of
the exclusionary rule and to discount police incentives to violate the
Constitution. But is Hudson consistent with Supreme Court precedent or is it true, as Justice Breyer states, that the opinion “represents a significant departure from the Court’s precedents”? 304 In Section IV of his opinion, Justice Scalia attempts to demonstrate that
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 645-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
542 U.S. 630, 633-34 (2004) (citation omitted).
Id. at 633.
Id. at 645 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2171 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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his opinion is consistent with the prior precedents of the Court. 305 According to Justice Scalia, “[a] trio of cases—Segura v. United States,
New York v. Harris, and United States v. Ramirez—confirms our conclusion that suppression is unwarranted in this case.” 306 Let us consider each of these cases.
C. Segura v. United States Does Not Support Hudson
The facts of Segura are complex and unique. Acting on information that Segura and his associate Colon were trafficking in cocaine
from their apartment, New York Drug Enforcement Task Force
agents placed them under surveillance. 307 They observed Colon deliver a bulky package to Ms. Parra at a restaurant parking lot while
petitioner Segura and Mr. Rivudalla-Vidal visited inside the restaurant. 308 The agents followed Parra and Rivudalla-Vidal to their
apartment and stopped them. 309 Parra was found in possession of cocaine, and she and Rivudalla-Vidal were immediately arrested. 310 After being advised of his constitutional rights, Rivudalla-Vidal admitted that he had purchased the cocaine from Segura and confirmed
that Colon had made the delivery at the restaurant. 311 Task Force
agents were then authorized by an Assistant United States Attorney
to arrest petitioners and were advised that since a search warrant for
petitioners’ apartment probably could not be obtained until the following day, the agents should secure the premises to prevent destruction of evidence. 312 Later that same evening, the agents arrested
petitioner Segura in the lobby of his apartment building, took him to
the apartment, knocked on the door, and, when it was opened by Colon, entered the apartment without requesting or receiving permission. 313 The agents conducted a limited security check of the apartment and observed various drug paraphernalia in plain view. 314 Colon was then arrested, and both Colon and Segura were taken into
custody. 315 Two agents remained in the apartment awaiting the warrant, but because of administrative delay the search warrant was not
issued until some nineteen hours after the initial entry. 316 In the
search pursuant to the warrant, the agents discovered cocaine and
305. Id. at 2168-70 (majority opinion).
306. Id. at 2168 (citing United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998); New York v. Harris,
495 U.S. 14 (1990); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984)) (internal citations omitted).
307. Segura, 468 U.S. at 799.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 800.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 800-01.
315. Id. at 801.
316. Id.
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records of narcotics transactions. 317 These items were seized together
with those items observed during the security check. 318
The district court granted petitioners’ pretrial motion to suppress
all the seized evidence. 319 The court of appeals held that the evidence
discovered in plain view on the initial entry should be suppressed,
but not the evidence seized during the warrant search. 320 The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals ruling. 321 The majority
opinion was, in the words of its author, Chief Justice Burger,
“carefully limited”: 322
Specifically, we hold that where officers, having probable cause,
enter premises, and with probable cause, arrest the occupants who
have legitimate possessory interests in its contents and take them
into custody and, for no more than the period here involved, secure
the premises from within to preserve the status quo while others, in good faith, are in the process of obtaining a warrant,
they do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s proscription
against unreasonable seizures. 323

Thus, Segura can be readily distinguished from Hudson. First,
evidence was suppressed in Segura as a result of the illegal entry
into the home. 324 All drug paraphernalia evidence the police observed
in plain view during their protective sweep of the apartment was
suppressed. 325 By applying the exclusionary rule to the fruits of the
unlawful entry, 326 the Court kept in place a significant deterrent for
police to enter homes without warrants. What the Court did not exclude was evidence that was found pursuant to a lawful, warranted
search the following day. 327 It was not alleged that the search that
yielded the additional evidence was conducted in an unreasonable
manner. Thus, the issue in Hudson, the manner of execution of a
warrant, 328 was neither raised nor considered in Segura. Justice
Scalia’s comparison of the two cases—“[l]ike today’s case, Segura involved a concededly illegal entry” 329 —is inapt. After Segura, one
could still say that the police must have a valid search warrant and

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 801-02.
Id. at 802-03.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 802-03.
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id. at 803-04.
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
Id. at 2168.
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must execute it in compliance with the Fourth Amendment in order
to introduce evidence found in the search. 330
D. New York v. Harris Does Not Support Hudson
Justice Scalia’s reliance on New York v. Harris 331 is similarly misplaced. In Harris, the police entered petitioner’s home to arrest
him. 332 While they had probable cause, they had not obtained a warrant, in violation of Payton v. New York. 333 Harris was advised of his
rights under Miranda while inside his home and made an incriminating statement. 334 He was then taken to the police station where
he was again advised of his Miranda rights and made another incriminating statement. 335 The issue before the Court was whether
the second confession, made at the stationhouse after a re-advisement
of rights, was so tainted by the initial illegal entry into Harris’ home
that it must be excluded as well as the first statement. 336 The Court
held:
[T]he station house statement in this case was admissible because Harris was in legal custody . . . and because the statement,
while the product of an arrest and being in custody, was not the
fruit of the fact that the arrest was made in the house rather
than someplace else. 337

As in Segura, the Harris Court did not question the propriety of
suppressing evidence acquired in the home as a result of an illegal
entry. The message to the police was that if they entered a home
without a warrant, any evidence obtained therein (in this case, incriminating statements) would be suppressed and even the reading
of Miranda rights would not dissipate the taint of the illegal entry. 338
Similarly, any spontaneous statements Harris might have made
would have been suppressed along with any physical evidence found
in the home during the illegal arrest, including evidence from a
330. Justice Stevens, in dissent, still worried about the incentives for abuse that the
Segura decision was creating:
The Court’s disposition, I fear, will provide government agents with an affirmative incentive to engage in unconstitutional violations of the privacy of the
home. The Court’s disposition is, therefore, inconsistent with a primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule—to ensure that all private
citizens—not just these petitioners—have some meaningful protection against
future violations of their rights.
Segura, 468 U.S. at 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
331. 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
332. Id. at 15-16.
333. Id. at 16 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 16-17.
337. Id. at 20.
338. Id. at 20-21.
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search of his person and the area under his immediate control, 339 evidence found during a protective sweep of the home, 340 and any other
evidence found in plain view. 341 Indeed, if Harris had remained silent
while in police custody on the way to the stationhouse, the police
would not have had any usable confession and conviction would have
been problematic. Thus, although Harris may have diluted the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule to enter a home to make an arrest
without a warrant, it did not eliminate it. 342
A careful reading of Segura and Harris reveals that they do not
support the Hudson decision. The four dissenters rejected Justice
Scalia’s reasoning: “It should be apparent by now that the three
cases upon which Justice Scalia relies—Segura v. United States; New
York v. Harris; and Ramirez—do not support his conclusion.” 343 And
Justice Kennedy specifically disagreed with Part IV of Justice
Scalia’s opinion, stating, “I am not convinced that Segura v. United
States and New York v. Harris have as much relevance here as Justice Scalia appears to conclude.” 344
E. United States v. Ramirez Does Not Support Hudson
The final case Justice Scalia cites in support of his position in
Hudson is United States v. Ramirez.345 At first glance, Ramirez does appear to support his argument. Justice Breyer refers to Ramirez as “offer[ing] the majority its last best hope.”346 According to Justice Scalia,
United States v. Ramirez involved a claim that police entry violated the Fourth Amendment because it was effected by breaking a
window. We ultimately concluded that the property destruction
was, under all the circumstances, reasonable, but in the course of
our discussion we unanimously said the following: “[D]estruction of
property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the
search are not subject to suppression.” Had the breaking of the
window been unreasonable, the Court said, it would have been
necessary to determine whether there had been a “sufficient causal
relationship between the breaking of the window and the discovery
of the guns to warrant suppression of the evidence.” What clearer
339. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
340. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
341. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
321, 323 (1987); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468-71 (1971).
342. Nevertheless, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens in dissent, bemoaned the majority’s “apparent blindness to the incentives the Court’s
ruling creates for knowing and intentional constitutional violations by the police.” Harris,
495 U.S. at 21-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
343. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2183 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
344. Id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
345. Id. at 2170 (majority opinion); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998).
346. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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expression could there be of the proposition that an impermissible
manner of entry does not necessarily trigger the exclusionary rule?347

In order to understand the context of the quotations taken from
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, the facts of Ramirez must be considered. A Deputy U.S. Marshal sought and received a “no-knock”
warrant granting permission to enter and search Ramirez’s home for
Alan Shelby, an escaped convict who was believed to be hiding
there. 348 Before executing the search warrant, the officers were informed by a reliable confidential informant that Ramirez “might
have a stash of guns and drugs hidden in his garage.” 349 However,
they did not seek a warrant to search for these items at the time as they
were focused on capturing Shelby. 350 After receipt of the search warrant,
law enforcement officers proceeded to Ramirez’s home, where
[i]n the early morning of November 5, approximately 45 officers
gathered to execute the warrant. The officers set up a portable
loud speaker system and began announcing that they had a search
warrant. Simultaneously, they broke a single window in the garage and pointed a gun through the opening, hoping thereby to
dissuade any of the occupants from rushing to the weapons the officers believed might be in the garage.
Respondent and his family were asleep inside the house at the
time this activity began. Awakened by the noise, respondent believed that they were being burglarized. He ran to his utility
closet, grabbed a pistol, and fired it into the ceiling of his garage.
The officers fired back and shouted “police.” At that point respondent realized that it was law enforcement officers who were trying
to enter his home. He ran to the living room, threw his pistol away,
and threw himself onto the floor. Shortly thereafter, he, his wife,
and their child left the house and were taken into police custody.
Respondent waived his Miranda rights, and then admitted that he
had fired the weapon, that he owned both that gun and another
gun that was inside the house, and that he was a convicted felon.
Officers soon obtained another search warrant, which they used to
return to the house and retrieve the two guns. 351

Ramirez argued that breaking his garage window was unreasonable. 352 The Supreme Court rejected this contention. 353 The police had
obtained a no-knock warrant and had, in fact, announced their presence over a loudspeaker. 354 They did not gain entry through the bro347. Id. at 2170 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71,
72 n.3 (1998).
348. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 68.
349. Id. at 68-69.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 69.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 70.
354. Id. at 68-69.
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ken window in the garage. 355 Furthermore, the police did not enter
the home until they heard a gunshot within. 356 After a fully Mirandized confession in which Ramirez admitted to possessing firearms,
the police sought a search warrant specifically to search for the
guns. 357 Despite these facts, the Ninth Circuit held that knock-andannounce was violated and the seizure of the guns was a direct result
of the unreasonable conduct of the police. 358 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
in response to this, inserted this footnote in his opinion:
After concluding that the Fourth Amendment had been violated in
this case, the Ninth Circuit further concluded that the guns should
be excluded from evidence. Because we conclude that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation, we need not decide whether, for example, there was sufficient causal relationship between the breaking of the window and the discovery of the guns to warrant suppression of the evidence. 359

By alluding in his footnote to the leading cases for the inevitable
discovery and attenuation exceptions to the exclusionary rule, Chief
Justice Rehnquist seems merely to be saying that before excluding
evidence, the Court must determine if any exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply. 360 Under the facts of Ramirez, a plausible argument could be made that Ramirez’ intervening act of firing the gun
broke the chain of causation. 361 Furthermore, his voluntary confession and the subsequent search with a second search warrant arguably attenuated the taint of any illegality on the part of the officers. 362
It may also be suggested that the police would have inevitably discovered the firearms because they would have sought a search warrant based on the reliable confidential informant’s tip that Ramirez
had guns and drugs. 363
In short, although Chief Justice Rehnquist did indicate that unreasonably breaking a window during the execution of a search warrant would not necessarily lead to suppression of evidence, 364 he did
not state that “an impermissible manner of entry does not necessar-

355. Id. at 69.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 69-70.
359. Id. at 72 n.3 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
360. See id.
361. This argument was made by Judge Kozinski in dissent in the Ninth Circuit decision United States v. Ramirez, 91 F.3d 1297, 1307 (1996) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), where
he cited what he believed to be controlling Ninth Circuit precedent: United States v. Garcia, 516 F.2d 318 (1975).
362. See Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 69.
363. See id. at 68-69.
364. Id. at 72 n.3.
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ily trigger the exclusionary rule.” 365 The alleged unnecessary destruction of property in Ramirez was a single pane of glass in a garage
door. 366 The police did not “enter” through the broken window, but
rather one officer pointed a gun through the broken garage window
while others entered the home. 367 All that the Ramirez dicta really
stands for is that the unreasonable breaking of a window by police
will not necessarily lead to suppression, an unremarkable proposition. 368 Even the most ardent supporter of the exclusionary rule
would be hesitant to suppress evidence merely because the police
gratuitously broke a window on the way in the house.
In short, none of the primary trio of cases cited by the majority offer any compelling support for their decision.
F. Established Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
Prior to Hudson, there were four established exceptions to the exclusionary rule: attenuation, 369 independent source, 370 inevitable discovery, 371 and good-faith. 372 The first three exceptions are generally
considered to be related and are collectively referred to as the “fruit
of the poisonous tree,” or “derivative evidence,” doctrine. Justice
Scalia drew heavily on the derivative evidence doctrine in his opinion, particularly the attenuation and inevitable discovery exceptions; 373 his reliance on this doctrine was misplaced.
The attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule was first expressed in Nardone v. United States 374 and was more fully developed

365. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2170 (2006).
366. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 69.
367. Id.
368. See id. at 72 n.3. The unreasonable breaking of a window is not necessarily a
knock-and-announce violation. The police might be perfectly justified in entering the home
to conduct a search, but if there were obvious ways to enter the home without damaging
private property, such as through an unlocked window or door, it would be unreasonable
for them to break a window to gain entry. If the police discovered guns in a subsequent
search, there would be a legitimate question as to whether there was a “sufficient causal
relationship between the breaking of the window and the discovery of the guns to warrant
suppression of the evidence.” Id. This would be an example where “unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though
the entry itself is lawful.” Id. at 71.
369. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338 (1939).
370. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
371. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 421 (1984).
372. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The majority does not rely on this exception in Hudson, but does cite Leon twice in support of its “social costs” argument and as
proof that the Court does not reflexively apply the exclusionary rule. Hudson v. Michigan,
126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165-66 (2006).
373. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2179-80.
374. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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in Wong Sun v. United States. 375 In Wong Sun, the defendant was the
subject of an unconstitutional arrest. 376 Several days after the arrest,
he voluntarily returned to the police station and made an inculpatory
statement. 377 The Court cited both the passage of time (“temporal
proximity”) and the voluntary act (“free will”) of the defendant in determining that the statement had “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” 378 In determining whether the attenuation exception
applies, courts must determine “whether, granting establishment of
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” 379
The independent source exception to the exclusionary rule was
first set forth in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States 380 and
more fully developed in Murray v. United States. 381 In Murray, the
police violated the Fourth Amendment by entering a warehouse
without a search warrant; inside, they discovered bales of marijuana. 382 The police then left the warehouse and obtained a search
warrant for the warehouse. 383 The warrant was based on probable
cause that the police had obtained lawfully prior to entering the
warehouse. 384 The Court remanded the case to the lower court to determine if “the warrant-authorized search of the warehouse was an
independent source of the challenged evidence,” with a plurality of
the Court strongly suggesting that it should be. 385 The independent
source doctrine is designed to put
the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have
been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. . . . When the
challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such
evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would
have been in absent any error or violation. 386

The inevitable discovery exception was created in Nix v. Williams. 387 In Nix, the police found the body of a victim after the mur-

375. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
376. Id. at 479, 490.
377. Id. at 476-77.
378. Id. at 491 (quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341).
379. Id. at 488 (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1982)).
380. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
381. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
382. Id. at 535.
383. Id. at 535-36.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 543-44.
386. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (citations omitted). One is tempted to
ask why should not the police be placed in a worse position because they violated the law?
Are not the rest of us placed in a worse position when we violate the law?
387. Id. at 444.
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der suspect, Williams, informed them of its location. 388 Although the
Court acknowledged that the police had obtained the information
from Williams in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and that his statement was thus inadmissible, the Court nevertheless admitted the evidence relating to the victim’s body. 389 Although
the body was a “fruit” of the statement, the Court held that the body
would have been discovered within a short time even without Williams’ cooperation because there was a search team already searching the area prior to his disclosure of the body’s location.390 The inevitable discovery exception created a sort of hypothetical independent
source doctrine based on the same rationale as independent source:
“[E]xclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been discovered
would also put the government in a worse position, because the police
would have obtained that evidence if no misconduct had taken place.” 391
G. Application of the Derivative Evidence Doctrine in Hudson:
Attenuation
There was no evidence of an act of free will or the passage of any
appreciable period of time between the “primary illegality” in Hudson and the discovery of the evidence. The rocks of cocaine sought to
be suppressed by the petitioner were discovered within a few seconds
of the illegal entry. 392 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia applies the concept of attenuation, citing Wong Sun. 393 He suggests that attenuation
can occur not only “when the causal connection is remote” but also
“when, even given a direct causal connection, the interest protected
by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be
served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” 394 Justice Scalia
cites New York v. Harris 395 as an example of application of this
meaning of attenuation, disregarding the fact that the Court in
Harris had explicitly declined to apply the attenuation doctrine in
that case by stating,
[A]ttenuation analysis is only appropriate where, as a threshold
matter, courts determine that “the challenged evidence is in some
sense the product of illegal governmental activity.” . . .
Harris’ statement taken at the police station was not the product of being in unlawful custody. Neither was it the fruit of having
been arrested in the home rather than someplace else. The case is

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id. at 436.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 449-50.
Id. at 444.
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
Id. at 2164.
Id.
495 U.S. 14 (1990).
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analogous to United States v. Crews. In that case, we refused to
suppress a victim’s in-court identification despite the defendant’s
illegal arrest. The Court found that the evidence was not “ ‘come at
by exploitation’ of . . . the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights,”
and that it was not necessary to inquire whether the “taint” of the
Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit
the introduction of the evidence. Here, likewise, the police had a
justification to question Harris prior to his arrest; therefore, his
subsequent statement was not an exploitation of the illegal entry
into Harris’ home. 396

Justice Scalia concluded that the evidence seized in Hudson was
attenuated “[s]ince the interests that were violated in this case have
nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence.” 397 Although Justice
Kennedy distanced himself from Justice Scalia’s dubious invocation
of New York v. Harris, he nevertheless ultimately endorses his view
of attenuation. 398 According to Justice Kennedy, “[u]nder our precedents the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce
requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression.” 399 Thus, under the majority’s logic, attenuation can occur instantly. According to Justice Scalia, the moment the constitutional
violation ended and the police stepped inside the home to begin their
lawful search, the taint of the failure to properly knock-andannounce was dissipated. 400 This instant attenuation concept is a clear
deviation from prior precedent. 401 Justice Breyer correctly states that
“the majority gives the word ‘attenuation’ a new meaning.” 402
H. Application of Derivative Evidence Doctrine in Hudson:
Inevitable Discovery
The Michigan Supreme Court relied exclusively on the inevitable
discovery exception in deciding that the exclusionary rule should not
be applied to knock-and-announce violations in People v. Stevens:
Given that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered,
allowing the evidence in does not put the prosecution in any better
position than it would be in had the police adhered to the knockand-announce requirement. However, excluding the evidence puts
the prosecution in a worse position than it would have been in had
there been no police misconduct. Therefore, the inevitable discov396. Id. at 19 (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)) (internal
citation omitted).
397. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
398. Id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I am not convinced that . . . New York v.
Harris ha[s] as much relevance here as Justice Scalia appears to conclude . . . .”).
399. Id. at 2170-71.
400. Id. at 2179-80.
401. See supra note 378.
402. Id. at 2180 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ery exception to the exclusionary rule should be available to the
prosecution in the present case. 403

Professor LaFave has called the People v. Stevens decision an “absurdity” and an “Alice-in-Wonderland version of inevitable discovery.” 404 Perhaps that is one reason the Hudson majority opinion, although affirming the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision not to apply
the exclusionary rule, never once mentions the term “inevitable discovery” nor cites People v. Stevens, Silverthorne, or Nix. But while
not explicitly using the phrase, the majority uses the description of
inevitable discovery: “Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had
obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the
house.” 405 This is a misapplication of the inevitable discovery doctrine. 406 As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent:
The Court nonetheless accepts Michigan’s argument that the requisite but-for-causation is not satisfied in this case . . . . As support for this proposition, Michigan rests on this Court’s inevitable
discovery cases.
This claim, however, misunderstands the inevitable discovery
doctrine. Justice Holmes in Silverthorne, in discussing an “independent source” exception, set forth the principles underlying the
inevitable discovery rule. That rule does not refer to discovery that
would have taken place if the police behavior in question had (contrary to fact) been lawful. The doctrine does not treat as critical
what hypothetically could have happened had the police acted lawfully in the first place. Rather, “independent” or “inevitable” discovery refers to discovery that did occur or that would have occurred (1) despite (not simply in the absence of) the unlawful behavior and (2) independently of that unlawful behavior. 407

403. 597 N.W.2d 53, 62 (1999). For a useful critique of People v. Stevens, see Robin L.
Gentry, Note, Why Knock? The Door Will Inevitably Open: An Analysis of People v. Stevens
and the Michigan Supreme Court’s Departure from Fourth Amendment Protection, 46
WAYNE L. REV. 1659 (2000). See generally Jenny Dobrovolec, Note, People v. Stevens: The
Michigan Supreme Court Applies the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
When Officers Violate the Knock and Announce Statute, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 569 (2001).
404. 6 LAFAVE, supra note 47, at 274-73.
405. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164.
406. For contrasting perspectives on the appropriateness of applying inevitable discovery to knock-and-announce violations, see Estrada, supra note 254; Mattias Luukkonen,
Knock, Knock. What’s Inevitably There? An Analysis of the Applicability of the Doctrine of
Inevitable Discovery to Knock and Announce Violations, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 153 (2004);
and Randall S. Bethune, Note and Comment: The Exclusionary Rule and the Knock-andAnnounce Violation: Unreasonable Remedy for Otherwise Reasonable Search Warrant Execution, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 879 (2001).
407. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2177-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)).
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V. THE SIGNIFICANCE AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF HUDSON
A. The New Parallel Universe Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
Despite the majority’s efforts to shoehorn the knock-and-announce
exception into existing precedent, Hudson does not fit into any of the
established exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Rather, by relying on
not what did happen, but what could have happened, Hudson in effect creates a whole new exception—what might be called the parallel universe exception to the exclusionary rule. Under this exception,
courts must ask the following question: if the same officers had conducted the same search, but doing only what they were authorized to
do under the Constitution, would they have found the same evidence? If the answer is “yes,” the evidence will be deemed admissible.
Therefore, if the officers in Hudson had simply conducted a lawful
search (with no knock-and-announce violation), as they were authorized by warrant to do, they would have found the same evidence. Justice Scalia has thus created a fictional parallel universe 408 in which
the police always act in good faith. In the real world, the police may
violate the Constitution with impunity without fear of having evidence
suppressed (so long as they do so in ways which do not enhance their
chances of finding evidence) because they can rely on their hypothetical
doppelgangers in the parallel universe to behave themselves.409
B. The Dimensions of the Parallel Universe Exception
The parallel universe exception could potentially exempt a variety
of unconstitutional police behaviors from the reach of the exclusionary rule. First, it seems clear that any violations in the manner of
execution of a warrant would be subject to this exception. So long as
the warrant itself is valid, the officers may engage in wholesale destruction of private property, both inside and outside the home, because the good parallel universe cops would have found the exact
same evidence without damaging the property at all. Similarly, the
timing of the execution of the search warrant could become largely
irrelevant. Officers intent on frightening or embarrassing the occupants of a home could execute a daytime warrant at nighttime, knowing that their imaginary counterparts would wait until the morning

408. For a nonscientists’ guide to the quantum physics-based cosmological theory of
parallel universes, see generally M.R. FRANKS, THE UNIVERSE AND MULTIPLE REALITY
(2003) and Max Tegmark, Parallel Universes, SCI. AM., May 2003, at 41.
409. Once again, Justice Scalia owes an unacknowledged ideological debt to Judge
Posner for the parallel universe concept, which Judge Posner introduced in United States
v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1999). See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
In Stefonek, Chief Judge Posner admitted evidence seized pursuant to a patently defective
warrant because “[t]he search would thus have been identical in scope, and exactly the
same evidence would have been seized, had the warrant complied with the Constitution.”
Id. at 1034.
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and seize the same incriminating items. 410 Even a stale warrant
could conceivably be revived in the parallel universe. The Court long
ago suggested that the Fourth Amendment prohibits excessive delay
in execution of a warrant even if no time constraints are imposed by
statute or the warrant itself. 411 The court recently reaffirmed this
view:
[P]robable cause may cease to exist after a warrant is issued. . . .
[T]he probable-cause showing may have grown “stale” in view of
the time that has passed since the warrant was issued. (“[T]he
facts in an affidavit supporting a search warrant must be sufficiently close in time to the issuance of the warrant and the subsequent search conducted so that probable cause can be said to
exist as of the time of the search and not simply as of some time
in the past.”). 412

Consider this hypothetical. Suppose the police apply for a warrant
to search a home. The application for the warrant provides probable
cause to believe that a crate of illegal arms was recently delivered to
a suspect’s home, and the police have reliable information that the

410. The Supreme Court has not explicitly held that nighttime searches are governed
by a higher standard than daytime searches, but Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by
Justices Douglas and Brennan, expressed the view that nighttime searches should require
more than standard probable cause:
This Court has consistently recognized that the intrusion upon privacy engendered by a search of a residence at night is of an order of magnitude greater
than that produced by an ordinary search. . . . “[I]t is difficult to imagine a
more severe invasion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a private
home.” . . . And our decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
was in large part based upon our revulsion at the thought of nighttime searches
of the marital bedroom to discover evidence of illegal contraceptive use.
....
. . . As even the Government in this case concedes, “searches conducted in the
middle of the night . . . involve a greater intrusion than ordinary searches and
therefore require a greater justification.” In my view, this principle may well be
a constitutional imperative.
Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
Justice Marshall also noted that “most of the States’ laws provide that search warrants
may only be served during the day unless express authorization for a nighttime search is
obtained, and such authorization can generally be obtained only by meeting special requirements for a nighttime search.” Id. at 464 n.1. The Supreme Court has not revisited
this issue in the past thirty-two years, but numerous lower courts have. See generally
Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Propriety of Execution of a Search Warrant at Nighttime,
41 A.L.R. 5TH 171 (1996). At the reargument in Hudson v. Michigan, Justice Souter suggested that a nighttime search could violate the Fourth Amendment: “[N]ighttime searches
when only a daytime search is authorized amounts to an unreasonable search.” Transcript
of Oral Argument at 57-58, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006) (No. 04-1360), 2006
WL 1522979; see United States v. Hurn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42768 (W.D. Wis. 2006)
(denying motion to suppress based on nighttime execution of warrant and citing Hudson).
411. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1932).
412. United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 1499 n.2 (2006) (quoting United States
v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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shipment will be moved to another location in eight days. The magistrate issues the warrant. The investigating officers then go on vacation for a week. On the ninth day, the officers decide to execute the
warrant even though they believe that the contraband was moved
the day before. There is a strong argument that the officer’s decision
is unconstitutional because, at the time the warrant is executed,
there is no probable cause to believe that items subject to seizure will
be found. But the officers are lucky, and they find the guns; the crate
has not been moved as they believed it had been. Was the entire
search improper because the warrant was no longer valid or was it
merely the manner of execution of the warrant (the timing) that was
improper? According to the Hudson Court, a knock-and-announce
violation is just a matter of arriving a few seconds early, so what is
the difference if the timing is a few hours late? In the parallel universe, the hypothetical good cops would have arrived exactly on time
and would have found the exact same crate of guns. Being late did
not “cause” the police to find the evidence, so the evidence should not
be suppressed.
C. Application of the Parallel Universe Exception to Terry Stops
The parallel universe exception is not logically limited to searches
of homes. It could, for example, apply to searches of persons conducted under Terry v. Ohio. 413 Suppose an officer has reasonable
suspicion that a young woman is planning to rob a store and that she
is armed. He is thus authorized, under Terry, to stop and frisk her. 414
The officer asks the young woman to turn around and put her hands
on the wall, then proceeds to fondle and squeeze her entire body, paying special emphasis to her private parts, as he searches her from
head to toe. The officer finds a gun stuck in the top of the suspect’s
sock under her trousers. Similarly, suppose an officer (again, with
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed) throws a suspect to the
ground, wrenches his arm up behind his back, and grinds his face
into the sidewalk while his partner searches him, finding a gun
tucked in the suspect’s waistband. Clearly, in both cases, the officers’
actions were unreasonable and exceeded the scope of an authorized
pat-down. But, in both cases, the officers were authorized to do a
Terry frisk, and had they patted down the suspects properly, they
would have found the weapons. Again, under the logic of Hudson,
there would be no reason to exclude the evidence.
There are cases which suggest that exceeding the scope of a Terry
frisk will result in the application of the exclusionary rule, but a close
reading of the cases reveals that these cases can be distinguished
413. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
414. Id. at 27.
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from the preceding examples. Consider, for example, Sibron v.
New York, 415 which involved a motion to suppress drugs found in
Sibron’s pocket:
[A]ssuming arguendo that there were adequate grounds to search
Sibron for weapons, the nature and scope of the search conducted
by Patrolman Martin were so clearly unrelated to that justification
as to render the heroin inadmissible. The search for weapons approved in Terry consisted solely of a limited patting of the outer
clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might be used
as instruments of assault. Only when he discovered such objects
did the officer in Terry place his hands in the pockets of the men
he searched. In this case, with no attempt at an initial limited exploration for arms, Patrolman Martin thrust his hand into Sibron’s
pocket and took from him envelopes of heroin. His testimony
shows that he was looking for narcotics, and he found them. 416

Sibron is different than the hypotheticals because Patrolman Martin
essentially skipped the frisk and reached straight into Sibron’s
pocket. 417 Thus, Patrolman Martin conducted a completely unauthorized search as opposed to conducting an authorized search in an unauthorized manner. If the hypothetically good Patrolman Martin had
conducted the pat-down of Sibron, he would not have found a weapon
(or anything that would have justified a more intrusive search).
The Court addressed another improper Terry search in Minnesota
v. Dickerson. 418 The evidence sought to be suppressed in Dickerson
was a lump of cocaine found in the suspect’s pocket:
[T]he officer determined that the lump was contraband only after
“squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the
defendant’s pocket”—a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon.
. . . [T]he police officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the
“strictly circumscribed” search for weapons allowed under Terry. . . .
Here, the officer’s continued exploration of respondent’s pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to
“[t]he sole justification of the search [under Terry:] . . . the protection of the police officer and others nearby.” It therefore
amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry expressly
refused to authorize . . . . 419

As in Sibron, the Court suppressed the cocaine. 420 Also like Sibron, had the officer conducted a proper Terry search, he would not
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

392 U.S. 40 (1968).
Id. at 65.
Id.
508 U.S. 366 (1993).
Id. at 378 (citations omitted).
Id. at 366.
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have reached into Dickerson’s pocket and found drugs. Because the
hypothetical good cop would not have discovered any evidence at all,
it would be consistent with Hudson to apply the exclusionary rule in
this case while still leaving room to decline to apply it in the hypothetical situations posed above.
D. A Bad-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
As these examples demonstrate, what is fundamentally different
about the parallel universe exception from the established exceptions
to the exclusionary rule is that it is a true “bad-faith” exception. 421 At
the time the police are faced with the choice of acting reasonably and
following the Constitution or acting unreasonably and intentionally
violating the Constitution, they can choose the latter course knowing
that there is no chance that any evidence will be excluded. Although
the inevitable discovery, independent source, and attenuation doctrines ultimately may allow some evidence discovered by bad-faith
behavior to be admitted at trial, the police still have to assume at the
time they choose to violate the Constitution that if their actions yield
incriminating evidence, it will be excluded. Although there is a
chance that subsequent good-faith police behavior or external events
beyond their control 422 will vitiate their conduct, they cannot rely on
this possibility. Thus, with the pre-Hudson derivative evidence exceptions, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule remained at
least tenuously in place. Under Hudson, the potential loss of evidence is no longer a deterrent.
E. The End of the Suppression Hearing
Hudson not only creates a new exception to the exclusionary rule,
but also fundamentally alters Fourth Amendment criminal practice.
Under pre-Hudson law, when a defendant believed his Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated by a failure to knock and announce, his counsel would file a motion to suppress evidence result421. Although all the hypotheticals deal with situations where the police had authority
to conduct a search (reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop or a warrant to search a home),
but acted in bad faith, the parallel-universe exception could also potentially be extended to
cover situations where the police acted in good faith, thinking that they had authority to
search when they did not. Under this theory, even a warrantless search of a home might
not be a basis for exclusion of the evidence found during the search, so long as the police
had probable cause for the search. Because the police had probable cause for the search,
had they gone to a magistrate, he or she would have issued a search warrant. In the parallel universe, had the police done what they should have done—sought the warrant—they
would have been able to conduct the same search lawfully and would have found the same
evidence. Evidence that could have been found constitutionally by hypothetical good cops
should not be suppressed. Professor Amar believes this is the logical next step in building
on Hudson to dismantle the exclusionary rule. See Amar, supra note 7.
422. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (independent voluntary confession of the defendant).
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ing from that violation. The trial court would then hold a suppression
hearing at which the defense could attempt to establish that the
Constitutional violation had occurred. The prosecution could put on
evidence to rebut the claim that a violation had occurred or concede
the violation and argue that an exception to the exclusionary rule
applied (or argue in the alternative that a violation did not occur, but
if it did, then an exception should apply).
Suppression hearings are procedural tools that serve important
purposes beyond simply determining whether evidence shall be suppressed. Suppression hearings bring police misconduct to light in a
public forum. The hearings may alert the prosecutor’s office, the
leadership of the police department, citizen review boards, and other
groups to the conduct of officers who should be disciplined. Additionally, it can highlight the need for additional training, either for individuals or for the entire department. Suppression hearings also establish a record that may be useful for the defendant and other victims of the constitutional violation in attempting to seek compensation or other redress for the harm they suffered. Even if evidence is
not ultimately suppressed, motions to suppress serve to reinforce the
need to comply with the Constitution in the minds of police officers
by subjecting officers’ actions to scrutiny and reminding them of the
possibility of suppression if they do not respect suspects’ rights.
The Hudson majority, on the other hand, seems to view suppression hearings as largely a waste of valuable judicial resources, referring to the extensive litigation occasioned by the exclusionary rule. 423
Hudson goes a long way toward solving that problem by eliminating
the need for suppression hearings in knock-and-announce cases 424
and by providing a basis for eliminating suppression hearings for a
variety of other types of constitutional violations in the future. By
removing the possibility that police abuses will come to light through
suppression hearings, Justice Scalia’s claim that knock-andannounce violations are not a major problem in need of deterrence 425
423. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006).
424. See, for example, United States v. Gaver, 452 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006),
where in response to a motion to suppress filed prior to Hudson, the Eighth Circuit stated
(citing Hudson), “We need not consider whether the officers acted reasonably by entering
without knocking and announcing, because even if there were a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the exclusionary rule would be inapplicable.” Id.; see also United States v.
Robinson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (D. Minn. 2006) (summarily denying motion to suppress based on alleged knock-and-announce violation); In re Frank S., 142 Cal. App. 4th
145, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“Defendant Frank S. contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence discovered incident to his arrest. He argues
that the arresting officer’s violation of the knock-and-announce rule requires exclusion of
the evidence. The claim fails because the United [States] Supreme Court recently held in
Hudson v. Michigan that violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not justify application of the exclusionary rule.”).
425. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68.

2007]

FRUITLESS POISONOUS TREES

721

can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Police violations may appear to
be on the decline simply because there will be few reported cases of
such violations.
One potentially hopeful note for those who believe Hudson was
wrongly decided is Justice Kennedy’s apparent willingness to reconsider his position if the decision results in increased police abuses as
the dissenting Justices fear:
Today’s decision does not address any demonstrated pattern of
knock-and-announce violations. If a widespread pattern of violations were shown, and particularly if those violations were committed against persons who lacked the means or voice to mount an
effective protest, there would be reason for grave concern. Even
then, however, the Court would have to acknowledge that extending the remedy of exclusion to all the evidence seized following a
knock-and-announce violation would mean revising the requirement of causation that limits our discretion in applying the exclusionary rule. That type of extension also would have significant
practical implications, adding to the list of issues requiring resolution at the criminal trial questions such as whether police officers
entered a home after waiting 10 seconds or 20. 426

Yet, however sincere Justice Kennedy may be, the likelihood of being
able to demonstrate such a widespread pattern without criminal defense counsel bringing violations to the notice of the courts and the
public through suppression motions is remote.
F. The Fruitless Poisonous Tree Doctrine
Just as Terry v. Ohio revolutionized Fourth Amendment analysis
by creating a new intermediate class of Fourth Amendment searches
and seizures subject to a lower standard than traditional “full-blown
searches,” Hudson effectively creates a new category of Fourth
Amendment violations subject to a similar lower standard. This category, starting with knock-and-announce violations, includes those
Fourth Amendment violations that, by their nature, do not merit the
exclusionary rule because they do not, by definition, yield poisonous
fruit. Filing a motion to suppress would be pointless in such cases because even if a constitutional violation could be established, there
would be no evidence subject to suppression. 427 This category of constitutional violations may be labeled fruitless poisonous trees: there is
a poisonous tree—a constitutional violation—but it is barren.

426. Id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
427. Indeed, after Hudson, it could be argued that filing a suppression motion for a
knock-and-announce violation would be unethical, since there is no “good faith basis in law
or fact” for such a motion. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2006) (Meritorious Claim and Contentions).
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Terry v. Ohio created an intermediate class of Fourth Amendment
searches and seizures: those requiring reasonable suspicion instead
of probable cause. 428 Terry stop-and-frisks were just the first category
of searches and seizures to be placed in this classification. Later, additional categories of searches were added: limited weapon searches
of cars, 429 protective sweeps for confederates in homes, 430 immigration stops, 431 vehicle stops to check license and registration, 432 temporary seizures of property, 433 and searches of probationers and their
homes. 434 As discussed below, Richards v. Wisconsin incorporated the
reasonable suspicion standard into the knock-and-announce arena,
allowing the police to dispense with the requirement if they have
reasonable suspicion of certain dangers. 435 The justification for the
less stringent standard adopted in Terry is the minimally intrusive
nature of the searches and seizures involved relative to full-scale
searches and seizures of persons and protected places. 436 Thus, the
minimally intrusive nature of a Terry stop was balanced against the
need for police protection, public safety, and effective law enforcement and was found to be reasonable. 437
G. Criteria for Fruitless Poisonous Trees
What is the basis for establishing a second tier of Fourth Amendment violations? What type of violations will fall into the fruitless
poisonous tree category in addition to knock-and-announce violations? Hudson provides several clues for the criteria to be applied.
One possibility is that placement in the class will require a balancing
of social costs versus deterrence value such as that conducted by Justice Scalia in Hudson. 438 Thus, any type of Fourth Amendment violation that a majority of the Court found unlikely to be deterred by the
exclusionary rule or which they determined there was little incentive
to commit could be considered a fruitless poisonous tree. The problem
with this criterion is that the social costs of the exclusionary rule will
always be high and the (theoretical) potential deterrence of internal
discipline or a civil suit will always be present. The social costs bal-

428. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
429. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
430. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
431. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
432. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
433. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
434. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (searching of probationers and their
homes is appropriate when supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized as a condition of probation).
435. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
436. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
437. Id. at 27.
438. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165-68 (2006)
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ancing analysis is really illusory. In truth, it is an argument to abandon the exclusionary rule altogether.
Another possibility implied by Hudson is that certain de minimis
violations should be considered fruitless poisonous trees because the
exclusionary remedy would be disproportionate. This argument was
specifically advanced by the government 439 and was one of the arguments relied upon by a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit in refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to a knock-and-announce violation
in United States v. Espinoza. 440 Justice Scalia did not explicitly endorse this argument, but used language which implies that the logic
appeals to him. For example, he repeatedly refers to the exclusionary
rule as the “massive remedy” 441 and also called it the “incongruent
remedy.” 442 Incongruent is simply a synonym for disproportionate.
Justice Scalia further highlighted his view of the disproportionality
between violation and remedy by minimizing the significance of the
violation, calling it a “misstep,” 443 and exaggerating the severity of
Hudson’s offense, dubiously claiming that “[l]arge quantities of drugs
were found.” 444 A major potential problem with exempting certain de
minimis violations is that as soon as a court has determined that a
constitutional violation is sufficiently minor as to be exempt from the
exclusionary rule, the police will immediately feel no need to comply
with that minor aspect of the Constitution.
H. Fruitless Poisonous Trees and Causation
Fourth Amendment violations that do not give the officers an evidentiary advantage or cause them to find evidence could also be considered fruitless poisonous trees. The dicta in Ramirez regarding a
sufficient causal relationship 445 has apparently been elevated to a
constitutional causation requirement, with five members of the Court
endorsing Justice Scalia’s view of “the requirement of unattenuated
causation.” 446 Justice Kennedy specifically relied on the Ramirez
footnote in his concurrence:

439. Id. at 2181 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The United States, in its brief and at oral argument, has argued that suppression is ‘an especially harsh remedy given the nature of
the violation in this case.’ ”) (citation omitted).
440. 256 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The [e]xclusion of [e]vidence is a
[d]isproportionately [s]evere [s]anction in [c]ases [w]here the [p]olice [c]onduct [d]oes [n]ot
[a]ctually [h]arm [p]rotected [i]nterests.”). The Seventh Circuit’s approach was criticized in
a vigorous dissent by Judge Wood and by the editors of the Harvard Law Review. Id. at
729 (Wood, J., dissenting); Recent Cases, supra note 87.
441. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168.
442. Id. at 2166.
443. Id. at 2164.
444. Id. at 2162.
445. 523 U.S. 65, 72 n.3 (1998).
446. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
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Under our precedents the causal link between a violation of the
knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression. Cf. United States v. Ramirez (application of the exclusionary rule depends on the existence of a “sufficient causal relationship” between the unlawful conduct and the
discovery of evidence). When, for example, a violation results from
want of a 20-second pause but an ensuing, lawful search lasting
five hours discloses evidence of criminality, the failure to wait at
the door cannot properly be described as having caused the discovery of evidence.
....
In this case the relevant evidence was discovered not because of
a failure to knock-and-announce, but because of a subsequent
search pursuant to a lawful warrant. 447

Indeed, according to Justice Kennedy, “extending the remedy of
exclusion to all the evidence seized following a knock-and-announce
violation would mean revising the requirement of causation that limits our discretion in applying the exclusionary rule.” 448
Although the Court has required some logical nexus between a
constitutional violation and the evidence sought to be suppressed,
the imposition of a rigid requirement that the constitutional violation
cause the police to acquire the evidence in order for the defendant to
qualify for the exclusionary rule is new, troubling, and inconsistent
with the way the Court has applied exclusionary rules in other contexts. For example, if the police fail to provide Miranda 449 warnings
to a suspect, incriminating statements made by the suspect are inadmissible. In Dickerson v. United States, the Court rejected a voluntariness test which would have admitted unwarned statements if
they were voluntarily made and therefore, at least arguably, not
caused by the lack of rights advisement. 450 The prosecution is not offered the opportunity to attempt to prove that the suspect would have
made the statements even if he had been given Miranda warnings.
Similarly, under the Sixth Amendment, an indicted defendant has
the constitutional right to counsel during lineups and other corporeal
identification procedures. 451 If counsel is not present at such a lineup,
evidence of the out-of-court identification is inadmissible at trial. 452
Did this constitutional violation cause the eyewitness to identify the
suspect? Would the eyewitness have identified the defendant anyway
if counsel had been there? It does not matter, because there is no

447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Id. at 2170-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 72 n.3).
Id. at 2171.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967).
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causation requirement. Even if the prosecutor could prove that the
lineup was conducted in a perfectly nonsuggestive manner and the
eyewitness undoubtedly would have made the identification even
with counsel present, the identification will be excluded.
The Court has specifically rejected causation analysis where it
could potentially benefit defendants. In Oregon v. Elstad, the suspect
was questioned while in police custody without Miranda warnings
and made an incriminating statement. 453 Later, at the police station,
he was given Miranda warnings. 454 He then gave a second, more
damaging statement. 455 The first statement was clearly inadmissible. 456 Elstad argued that this second statement should also be inadmissible because the initial constitutional violation was the fruit of
the earlier statement. 457 He argued that he had already let the “cat
out of the bag” and therefore, not realizing that the first statement
would be suppressed, saw no point in remaining silent. 458 In this
sense, the constitutional violation (the initial failure to warn) caused
the police to obtain the second confession. According to Elstad, but
for the police’s initial failure to advise him of his rights, he would not
have confessed either time. 459 The Court rejected this argument. 460
Requiring proof of direct causation before evidence will be excluded could potentially lead to serious abuses by police. Property destruction and physical abuse of suspects are examples of Fourth
Amendment violations that typically do not cause evidence to be
found. As discussed earlier, “[e]xcessive or unnecessary destruction of
property in the course of a search” 461 could encompass a wide range
of activities. The destruction could take place prior to or as part of
the entry or once inside during the search. For example, the police
could break an expensive stained glass window, rather than simply
lifting up an open window or knocking out a less expensive plate
glass window, or they could destroy a heavy and expensive front door
and frame, when they could just as easily break through an inexpensive side door. This unnecessary destruction would not be a knockand-announce violation, assuming the police announced their presence and waited an appropriate time before entering. It would be unreasonable, though, and thus violate the Fourth Amendment, if there
were no good reason to cause such extensive or expensive damage.
The police could also cause unnecessary damage after a lawful entry
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.

470 U.S. 298, 301 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 301-02.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 300.
United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998).
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by ransacking the interior (breaking furniture, slashing mattresses,
ripping up carpet, tossing clothes and papers around, and leaving
piles of debris with no thought for the potential clean up and reorganization problems) while ostensibly searching through the home.
The property destruction would not be causally related to the finding
of evidence, because the police would have found the incriminating
evidence if they had conducted the search carefully minimizing property damage. Similarly, the police could rough up the occupants of a
home during a search. Although clearly unreasonable, such behavior
would not likely lead the police to additional evidence that they
would not find by diligently searching. Thus, the poisonous tree—the
constitutional violation—would not bear fruit.
I. Media Presence During a Search: The First Fruitless Poisonous
Tree?
There is another type of Fourth Amendment violation that the
Court has previously suggested fits in the fruitless poisonous tree
category, albeit one likely to be rare. In Wilson v. Layne, the Court
held that “it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to
bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during
the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in
the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.” 462 Because
Wilson was a civil damages suit, 463 the Court did not need to consider
whether the exclusionary rule should apply. 464 Nevertheless, Chief
Justice Rehnquist added, in an accompanying footnote:
Even though such actions might violate the Fourth Amendment,
if the police are lawfully present, the violation of the Fourth
Amendment is the presence of the media and not the presence of
the police in the home. We have no occasion here to decide whether
the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered or
developed by the media representatives. 465

It is surprising that Justice Scalia did not discuss Wilson in Hudson, because it was cited in the briefs and arguably offers the strongest support of any precedent for his decision. Wilson debatably
stands for the proposition that even when the police act unreasonably in some aspect of the manner of their execution of the search (in
this case, by allowing a media representative to accompany them, an
unnecessary invasion of the occupant’s privacy comparable to a
knock-and-announce violation) and thereby violate the Fourth
Amendment, exclusion does not necessarily follow. Wilson also lends
462.
463.
464.
465.

526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999).
Id. at 608.
Id. at 614 n.2.
Id.
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support to the theory that a violation in the manner in which a
search is conducted can be separated from the lawfulness of the
search itself. Although the police violated the Constitution, Wilson
suggests that any evidence the police found would still be admissible.
Indeed, this is exactly how lower courts have interpreted Wilson. For
example, in Artis v. United States, the appellant claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to file a motion to suppress on the basis that the police had allowed a television
news crew to accompany them during the execution of the search
warrant. 466 Citing Wilson, the court rejected this argument, stating
that the exclusionary rule would not have applied anyway, so there
was no justification for defense counsel to file a suppression motion. 467 Similarly, in United States v. Hendrixson, the Eleventh Circuit held that evidence would not be subject to exclusion where
unlawful media presence did not expand the scope of a police search
beyond that allowed by the terms of the warrant or otherwise facilitate the search, again citing the footnote in Wilson. 468
J. Multiple Fourth Amendment Violations
One issue not addressed in Hudson is what happens when there
are multiple Fourth Amendment violations during the same search.
Suppose the police learn of a possible child pornography collector.
The individual has no prior criminal record and lives alone, and
there is no basis to believe he owns a weapon. His collection is alleged to include magazines and numerous files on his computer’s
hard drive, with backup copies on CDs. The collector is also alleged
to have tried to lure some young children into his home to be photographed. The police apply for and receive a warrant to search the
suspect’s home for child pornography. There is no basis for either a
nighttime or a no-knock warrant. The police do not expect any danger to themselves, nor do they anticipate efforts to destroy evidence.
But the officers involved despise pedophiles and decide to teach the
suspect a lesson. Rather than wait for daylight, they execute the
warrant in the middle of the night. They break down the front door
466. 802 A.2d 959, 964 (D.C. 2002).
467. Id. at 967-68.
468. 234 F.3d 494, 496-97 (11th Cir. 2000). An interesting twist in Wilson is the suggestion that evidence found by the media representative during the search might be subject to the exclusionary rule. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614, n.2. Thus if the police actually allowed the media to assist in the search, as opposed to merely observe the search, then the
evidence unearthed by the media might be suppressed. It seems to me, especially in light
of Hudson, that if actually confronted with this situation, the Court would decline to suppress the evidence, citing the inevitable discovery exception. That is, if the police were already in the home executing an otherwise valid search warrant, and they had not allowed
the media representative to participate in the search, they eventually would have found
whatever the media representative found on his/her own.
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with a battering ram, rough up the suspect, and trash his entire
house, trampling on his belongings with muddy feet, crumpling up
his magazines and papers, and knocking over lamps and other
breakable objects. During this search, they find incriminating evidence. The police have violated the Constitution in several ways: unreasonably destroying property, both upon entry and during the
search; unreasonably executing the warrant at night; blatantly disregarding knock-and-announce; and physically abusing a suspect.
Clearly, this is an “unreasonable search and seizure.” 469 But should
the evidence be suppressed? Under the logic of Hudson, there is a
strong possibility that it would not be. Both individually and collectively, none of these violations can be said to have “caused” the police
to find the evidence or given them an evidentiary advantage. Had the
police simply executed the search warrant in a reasonable, good-faith
manner, they would have found exactly the same evidence.
Lest the hypothetical be considered too far-fetched, consider
United States v. Larabee. 470 In Larabee, the Sheriff’s Department received a warrant to search an apartment at approximately 5:00
p.m. 471 The search warrant was executed at approximately 11:10 p.m.
by four deputy sheriffs, although they had no good reason to execute
the search at night. 472 When the officers executed the search warrant, they banged on the door and the side of the apartment with
their fists while simultaneously shouting “Sheriff’s Office—search
warrant” three times. 473 Although they had no specific reason to fear
for their safety or that evidence would be destroyed, they did not
pause and wait for a reply. 474 They immediately pried open the storm
door of the apartment and kicked open the front door, damaging the
storm door and the door jamb in the process. 475 A motion to suppress
was filed and granted. 476 The district court’s conclusion:
The search warrant was executed in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment because there was an inadequate justification for executing the warrant at night and because the officers did not wait a
reasonable time to determine whether their request to enter the
apartment was refused before forcibly opening the doors. In addition, the officers damaged the entry to the apartment when they exe-

469. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
470. No. 05-40070-01-RDR, 2006 WL 839451 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2006); see also United
States v. Nielson, No. 04-40068-01-RDR, 2004 WL 3186011 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 2004), aff’d,
415 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005).
471. Larabee, 2006 WL 839451, at *1.
472. Id. at *1, *4.
473. Id. at *2.
474. Id. at *4.
475. Id. at *2.
476. Id. at *5.

2007]

FRUITLESS POISONOUS TREES

729

cuted the warrant. All of these factors lead the court to conclude that
this was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 477

Larabee was announced three months prior to Hudson. 478 After
Hudson, it is unlikely that the three factors that rendered the search
unreasonable would be sufficient to warrant suppression. 479 But can
it be that the police can repeatedly and deliberately violate a defendant’s rights without triggering the exclusionary rule? One possible
argument in favor of suppression in cases like Larabee is that the
multiple violations would take this case out of the de minimis violation category so that suppression would no longer be “incongruent.” 480 Whether or not the cumulative unreasonableness of multiple
violations of the Fourth Amendment should be enough to warrant
suppression remains an open question that the Supreme Court will
ultimately have to address. One could argue that two or more Fourth
Amendment violations, which individually fall into the fruitless poisonous tree category, should bear poisonous fruit when they are combined. This approach would afford one potential way to limit the
scope of Hudson, but such an approach could lead to anomalous and
unfair results. Why should suppression be unavailable for a single
but egregious knock-and-announce violation, yet available for two
less serious Fourth Amendment violations? The basic problem with
Hudson is that it has begun the process of ranking Fourth Amendment violations in the first place, thereby weakening the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 481 Going further down
this road will not undo the damage to the Fourth Amendment
wrought by Hudson.
VI. CONCLUSION
By creating a new exception to the exclusionary rule as well as a
second-class category of Fourth Amendment violations that are
automatically excluded from the coverage of the exclusionary rule,
the Court has not only failed to deter violations and encourage compliance with the Fourth Amendment by the police, but has affirmatively encouraged lawless behavior by officers and departments who
will no longer be restrained by fear of losing criminal prosecutions.
The sad reality of Hudson is that police can now intentionally choose
to violate the Constitution, knowing that it may have no effect on any
subsequent prosecution. Despite Justice Kennedy’s assurances that
477. Id.
478. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006) (decided June 15, 2006); Larabee,
2006 WL 839451, at *1 (decided Mar. 28, 2006);
479. Larabee, 2006 WL 839451, at *5.
480. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
481. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the decision is narrowly confined to “the specific context of the knockand-announce requirement,” 482 it is unlikely that the current Court
majority will limit Hudson to its facts and not follow it to its logical
conclusion, especially considering the recent trend of the Court
minimizing the risk of police abuses while narrowing the reach of the
exclusionary rule. 483
The real danger of Hudson is not merely that it “destroys the
strongest legal incentive to comply with the Constitution’s knockand-announce requirement” and that “it weakens, perhaps destroys,
much of the practical value of the Constitution’s knock-and-announce
protection,” 484 but that, by severely undermining the exclusionary
rule, it may weaken—and perhaps destroy—the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. Hudson has given a green light to a potentially
wide range of intentional unreasonable police conduct. It is unfortunate that such a momentous and troubling decision is built on such a
shaky logical foundation. Perhaps in Justice Scalia’s parallel universe, where all the police departments are models of professionalism
and restraint, the exclusionary rule would not be needed to deter official misconduct. But in the real world of twenty-first-century America, the full protection of the exclusionary rule is still needed if the
Fourth Amendment is to be more than an empty promise.

482. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
483. See, e.g., Part IV.A.
484. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

